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ABSTRACT 
 “Ye Sons of Mars”: British Representations of the Sudan Campaign in Print 
Culture, 1884-1899 
Crystal Eunique Smith 
 From 1884 to 1885 the British were first engaged with the Mahdist forces of 
Sudan in an effort to first rescue the inhabitants of Khartuom, and later to rescue the 
rescuer Charles “Chinese” Gordon. The affair played out both in Parliament and the 
newspapers as journalists became the cheerleaders for Empire. My thesis focuses on 
Britain’s 1884-1890 Sudan Campaign through print culture using political debates, 
journalism, literature, memoirs, and art. I show how the activism of the press and the 
romanticism of the larger media reinforced ideas about imperialism and the British role 
within the Empire at large.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
YE sons of Mars, come join with me, 
And sing in praise of Sir Herbert Stewart’s little army, 
That made ten thousand Arabs flee 
At the charge of the bayonet at Abu Klea. 
"The Battle of Abu Klea," William Topaz McGonagall 
Everyone here praises loudly the admirable manner in which the affair was conducted 
by General Stewart, who for his part speaks in the highest terms of the conduct of all 
ranks. Our loss was severe but our success was complete. 
The Times, 22nd January 1885  
 By the start of January 1885, General Gordon's defense of Khartoum was running 
out of time. The relief column commanded by Lord Wolseley had left from Wadi Haifa 
in August, but down on the banks of the Nile they had only progressed as far as Korti, 
250 kilometers south of Khartoum. In desperation, Wolseley formed a fifteen thousand 
man camel corps under the command of General Sir Herbert Stewart. On the 16th of 
January, Stewart's column engaged with a large party of Mahdist at the oasis of Abu 
Klea. Meeting fierce fighting, a primitive machine gun- the Gardner gun- was manned by 
sailors who proceeded to open fire on the Mahdi's forces. By the end of the fierce 
fighting seventy-four British were dead, with another ninety-four wounded. However, 
the Mahdists lost around elven thousand with countless more injured, victims of the 
tremendous fire power of the British. In the words of Hilarie Belloc: "we have got the 
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Maxim gun and they have not." Of course, the Maxim gun was not used at Abu Klea, but 
it would be the Emin Pasha Expedition in Equitoria, a colonial adventure made necessary 
by the events in the Egyptian Sudan. 
 From 1884 to 1885 the British were initially engaged with the Mahdist forces of 
Sudan in an effort to rescue the inhabitants of Khartuom, then later to rescue the rescuer 
Charles “Chinese” Gordon. The events played out in Parliament, the newspapers, in 
novels, and art. The Sudan was the battleground of British ideologies surrounding Big 
and Little England, the role of Imperialism, and Britain’s shrinking power on the world 
stage. The defeat in 1885 and subsequent return in the 1890s fed the romantic Imperial 
desires of writers of New Journalism, which in turn would inspire the fiction writers of 
adventure novels and romances. Industrial machines like the Maxim gun became the 
symbol of British Imperialism and perceived power.  
 General Charles “Chinese” Gordon (1833-1885) was a career officer and colonial 
administrator.  The son of an officer, having joined the army at sixteen, and becoming by 1
thirty a highly successful captain in the Royal Engineers, Gordon went on to win an 
international reputation as a brilliant commander of irregular forces in the service of the 
Chinese emperor during the mid-1860s. His success garnered attention from the British 
press, which gave him the nickname of “Chinese” Gordon.  Thereafter, Gordon had held 2
C. Brad Fraught, Gordon: Victorian Hero, (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2008), 1.1
 Fraught, 29;  In 1860 Gordon was a volunteer officer to assist Chinese officials in putting down 2
the Taiping Rebellion. Led by Hong Xiuquan who proclaimed himself to be the brother of Jesus 
Christ, Xiuquan and his followers (the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom) wanted the Chinese people 
converted their interpretation of Christianity. These rebels would ultimately be defeated by the 
Qing military force the “Ever Victorious Army,” led by Gordon. During this time Gordon led his 
men to thirty-three battles, all resulting in victory. 
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a number of commands, including the Governorship of Equatoria, the southernmost 
province of the Sudan, between 1874 and 1879, as well as posts in India, China (once 
more), Ireland, Mauritius, and the Cape.  He had also spent a year in Palestine 3
investigating the sites of the Holy Places . However, it would be his return to the Sudan 4
that would cement Gordon as a martyr of the British Empire.  
 In 1873 the British had assumed responsibility over Egypt in order to protect their 
interests in the Suez Canal and ensure repayment of loans to the Egyptian 
government.  Gordon was appointed governor of Sudan and he immediately intensified 5
the anti-slavery campaign started by the Egyptian ruler Muhammed Ali a decade 
earlier.  Sudanese Arab leaders, however, saw British efforts as a European Christian 6
attempt to undermine Muslim Arab dominance in the region. On June 29, 1881, a 
Sudanese Islamic cleric, Muhammad Ahmad, proclaimed himself the Mahdi.  Playing 
into decades of disenchantment over Egyptian rule and new resentment against the 
British, Ahmad immediately transformed an incipient political movement into a 
fundamentally religious one. Urging jihad or “holy war” against imperial Egypt, Ahmad 7
formed an army.   
 Ibid, 43, 46, 69, 58-59. 3
 Ibid, 72. 4
 John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000, (New York: 5
Bloomsbury Press, 2008), 308.
 Fraught, 45.6
 Darwin, 344. 7
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 By 1882 the Mahdist Army had taken complete control over the area surrounding 
Khartoum.  Then in 1883, a joint British-Egyptian military expedition under the 8
command of British Colonel William Hicks launched a counterattack against the 
Mahdists. Hicks was soon killed and the British decided to evacuate the Sudan. Gordon 
was sent in 1884 to evacuate the capital of Khartoum. Fighting continued however and 
the British-Egyptian forces which defended Khartoum in a long siege were finally 
overrun on January 28, 1885.  Virtually the entire garrison was killed. Gordon was 9
beheaded during the attack.    
 In June 1885 Ahmad, the self-proclaimed Mahdi, died.  As a result the Mahdist 10
movement quickly dissolved as infighting broke out among rival claimants to leadership. 
Hoping to capitalize on internal strife, the British returned to the Sudan in 1896 with 
Horatio Kitchener as commander of another Anglo-Egyptian army. In the final battle of 
the war on September 2, 1898 at Karari, 11,000 Mahdists were killed and 16,000 were 
wounded.  Ahmad’s successor called the Khalifa fled after his forces were overrun. In 11
November of 1899 he was found and killed, officially ending the Mahdist state.  12
In the larger context of scholarship regarding the British Empire, the Sudan 
Campaign has been overlooked in academic history as opposed to popular histories 
(especially in the 1970s). What the Sudan Campaign has been is an example for 
 Ibid.8
 Ibid. 9
 Harold E. Raugh, The Victorians at War, 1815-1914: An Encyclopedia of British Military 10
History, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004), 37.
 Raugh, 192. 11
 Ibid. 12
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Imperialist and Imperial apologists of the romance of the British stiff upper lip or 
stoicism in the face of adversity, especially in the last stand of General Gordon. His death 
was immortalized by Charlton Heston in the film Khartoum and has been the subject of 
numerous biographies.   
However, the events at Khartoum and in the subsequent Sudan Campaign were 
part of Britain’s larger Imperial project and spheres of influence in Africa. But the 
Empire did not just exist in the periphery, it also affected the everyday life of Britons 
back in the home nation. The economic engine of the Empire produced goods made 
possible by the resources of the Empire. In turn, advertisements then marketed these 
goods using the exploits and spoils of Imperial adventures. These adventurers in turn 
became the heroes of literature. Journalists as special correspondents made themselves 
heroes in their dispatches from the periphery. Politicians then sanctioned these exploits 
by adding new colonies and “protectorates” into the fold.  
This thesis argues that by looking at the example of representations of the Sudan 
Campaign in print culture, we can observe that the press was not only aware of the 
empire, but deeply invested in imperial matters. In this aim, political debates, journalism, 
literature, and memoirs will be used. Ultimately the British public was also the Imperial 
public, and this public influenced and was influenced by Imperial activity. The British 
Empire could not have been as powerful and lasting unless civil society bought into the 
concept of Britain as an Empire. 
!5
As events in the Empire captured the imagination of the British press at home, 
books portraying Imperial military campaigns and their heroes, on the general history of 
Africa and their peoples, adventure narratives of popular figures, and biographies of 
heroes like Gordon or the Emin Pasha were produced. For the purposes of this project I 
will be focusing of those print materials  released first in the period between 1884 and 
1899 as they would have been concurrent with both events in question and reflect the 
mood surrounding them in the wider print culture. 
 The role of the press is an important aspect of Jürgen Habermas’s concept of the 
Public Sphere. For Habermas, the public there is a distinct space from one’s home life, 
the church, and the government. It is instead a space for people to gather and discuss 
ideas. Newspapers were a way to disseminate these ideas to a wider audience. However, 
as Nancy Fraser points out, this was a bourgeois public sphere, space not for the masses 
but for the educated elite.  The democratization of access to print opened the door to the 13
mass production of the press. This mass production allowed the press industry to 
manipulate public opinion.  14
 Thus, this thesis takes the approach that print culture, fueled by an activist press 
and romanticized media, manipulated public opinion. Personal opinions were consumed 
within the private sphere. These private personal opinions were then co-opted by 
journalists like Stead to construct a public opinion that put pressure on politicians. Mark 
 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 13
Existing Democracy,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun, (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 1992), 112. 
 Fraser, 113. 14
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Hampton notes that as journalism shifted from a source “of communication to one of 
commerce” the mass audience as consumer became a driving force of the media.  The 15
emergence of New Journalism allowed for the commodification of journalism 
indoctrinating fixed opinions to be bought by the larger public. 
In the 1880s New Journalism emerged with the special correspondent taking 
center stage. Politicians would quote their words on the floor of the parliament and 
writers would make the correspondents the protagonists of their novels. The most famous 
example would be that of Winston Churchill who would pen The River War in 1898 as a 
young cavalry officer and correspondent for the Morning Post. W.T. Stead of the Pall 
Mall Gazette  and his interview with Charles Gordon is of major importance to this thesis 
as it was his interview with Stead that  started the popular movement to send Gordon to 
Khartoum. The conservative Spectator, the liberal Times, along with other regional 
newspapers will be used to see how the Sudan Campaign was reported on in the press 
and to discern any ideological views of Britain’s role there. 
Literature in nineteenth century Britain was often topical and would comment on 
current events and issues of importance. However, romantic novels and poems of 
escapism became popular with the public. Writers such as Rudyard Kipling depicted the 
war and its participants as adventures and thrill seekers. Kipling’s The Light that Failed 
and his poem “Fuzzy-Wuzzy” depicts soldiers and war correspondents experiences in the 
 Mark Hampton, “Repeating the Public Sphere: The New Journalism and Its Historians, in 15
Transatlantic Print Culture, 1880-1940: Emerging Media, Emerging Modernisms, eds. Ann Ardis 
and Patrick Collier, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 53. 
!7
Sudan. Hilarie Belloc’s epic poem The Modern Traveller as well as Henry Newbolt’s 
“Vitaï Lampada” examine the ideological aspects of the Empire in Africa.  
Reading newspapers and other forms of the popular press as source material on 
attitudes is, of course, problematic.   Indeed, one of the key challenges any historian 
confronts is tracing attitudes through written records.  Memoirs, diaries, and letters are of 
course vital sources in this respect, but such sources may provide only an incomplete 
account of a person’s personal reflections and feelings.  The challenge becomes even 
greater when attempting to ascertain the consciousness of a group of people.  This is 
especially true when dealing with public opinions on a national level, where the so-
called “national consciousness” was often splintered by political, social, cultural, 
historical, geographical, and economic influences into a multitude of perspectives.    
Nonetheless, as Michael de Nie has noted, the nineteenth-century British press 
can appropriately be seen as a reflection and product of the public’s awareness and 
engagement in the world around it.  In addition the press, in particular the local press, 
were for many the primary source of news and served effectively to connect the public to 
the societal and governmental issues of the day.   As Lord Lytton noted in 1833:  16
Large classes of men entertain certain views on matters of policy, trade or morals.  
A newspaper supports itself by addressing these classes; it brings to light all the 
knowledge requisite to enforce or illustrate the view of its supporters; it embodies 
also the prejudice, the passion and the sectarian bigotry that belong to one body 
of men engaged in active opposition to one another.  It is, therefore, the organ of 
 Michael de Nie, The Eternal Paddy: Irish Identity and the British Press, 1798-1882 (Madison:  16
University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 28-30.  
!8
opinion; expressing at once the truths, the errors, the good, and the bad of the 
prevalent opinion it represents.   17
  
 Alan Lee has contended that throughout the eighteenth century, the press served a 
vital function of horizontally connecting the various segments of the reading public—a 
purpose that de Nie insists carried over into the nineteenth century.   The public then 18
would almost certainly have gained an appreciation for that exchange of ideas through 
the editorials, which would refer to other concurring and conflicting opinions, or through 
serial columns such as the Pall Mall Gazette’s “Epitome of Opinion,” which 
purposefully encapsulated snippets of the editorial pages of the London and provincial 
papers on issues of national importance.  In this way, not only did provincials gain 
greater access to the opinion of the Londoners, but perhaps more importantly, Londoners 
became connected to the opinions on the periphery of the country.  
  In addition to reflecting sentiments, the nineteenth-century press was also an 
invaluable agent for creating public opinion.  Having largely been the mouthpiece of the 
government in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, by the mid-nineteenth 
century the press had effectively become a “fourth estate” and challenged parliament as 
the leading center of political discussion.   At the end of the nineteenth century, imperial 19
critics, such as J. A. Hobson, raised concerns that the press was effectively being coopted 
by imperialists in order to further propagandize the public. It is those sentiments and 
 Edward Lytton Bulwer, England and the English, vol. xlviii (Paris: Baudry’s European Library, 17
1833), 245. 
 De Nie, The Eternal Paddy, 30. 18
 Ibid. 19
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opinions that the present study is interested in exploring.  Both as a reflection of public 
sentiment and as an important proactive agent in driving public interest, the content of 
the national and provincial press provides a vital conduit for the researcher to create a 
composite interpretation of the public discourse.   However, both functions have their 20
imperfections.  As a reflection, one must consider whether even the composite opinions 
by the press are fully representative of society as a whole.  For as de Nie points out, 
Victorians largely regarded the public opinion associated with the press to be closely 
attached to the middle class.25  As a proactive force, meanwhile, one must question—as 
does Porter—the degree to which such ideas were readily accepted by the public.  Taking 
those issues into account, when this thesis speaks of the public’s opinions on the issue of 
imperialism, what is meant by this is the opinions of the public in so far as they were 
expressed by the press.  
The focus of this thesis is the perception of the Sudan Campaign within the 
public sphere. It is therefore situated within the scholarship of the past thirty years which 
looks at the intersection of culture and imperialism. The work of  John MacKenzie has 
been influential in understanding this intersection. His pioneering work Propaganda and 
Empire has helped to shift the focus to cultural history at home which had an influence 
of creating ideology regarding empire as well as feeling.  More recently Andrew 21
Griffiths in his book The New Journalism, The Imperialism, and the Fiction of Empire, 
 For the purposes of this study, the phrase “national press” refers to metropolitan papers, 20
such as the London Times, that reached out to a nationwide audience.  25 De Nie, The 
Eternal Paddy, 29. 
 John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 21
1860-1960, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) 
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1870-1900 has linked the emergence of New Journalism in the late nineteenth century 
with the New Imperialism of the era.  Journalism and fiction worked in concert to 22
sensationalize events in the colonies for enjoyment in the metropole.  
At the center of the emergence of New Imperialism and New Journalism was the 
hero. Heroic worship became a mainstay of Victorian culture and helped reinforce fealty 
to the larger imperial project. Eric Hobsbawm’s “Mass Producing Traditions: Europe, 
1870-1914” in his and Terrance Ranger (eds.) The Invention of Tradition, interprets the 
rise of hero-cults as a feature of the emerging nation-state.  The essay emphasizes the 23
role of the state in promoting heroes through public monuments, ceremonies and 
schooling, and shows how distinctive national stories were part of a broader global 
process. 
Graham Dawson’s Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining 
of Masculinities explores the making of the soldier hero mythology drawing upon the 
work of 19th century adventure stories.  Edward Berenson’s Heroes of Empire: Five 24
Charismatic Men and the Conquest of Empire looks at popular heroes in both France and 
Britain (including Charles Gordon) to explore how the popular press creates heroes and 
encourages imperial hero worship.  Bernard Porter’s The Absent Minded Imperialists 25
 Andrew Griffiths, The New Journalism, The Imperialism, and the Fiction of Empire, 22
1870-1900, (New York: Springer, 2015). 
 Eric Hobsbawm, “Mass Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914” in The Invention of 23
Tradition, eds. Eric Hobsbawm and Terrance Ranger, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 
 Graham Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of 24
Masculinities, (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
 Edward Berenson, Heroes of Empire: Five Charismatic Men and the Conquest of Empire, 25
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).
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includes Gordon in his discussion of imperial sacrifices, using him as an example of 
someone willing to make the ultimate sacrifice in service to his country . Porter does not 26
analyze the implications of his death in a larger imperial context, but relegates further 
discussion of the matter to an endnote. Porter’s book aims to describe the entire imperial 
project undertaken by Britain. 
This connection between empire and culture in the metropole, has been made 
possible due to recent scholarship that have pushed for a more constituted view of the 
British Empire. Catherine Hall’s Civilising Subjects has been the standout in this new 
vein of scholarship. She studies the relationship between Birmingham and Jamaica in the 
middle of the nineteenth century.  The missionaries and businessmen from Birmingham 27
who traveled to Jamaica had non-conformist behavior due to being shaped by both the 
province and the metropole. Discourse between the colonist and imperialist were shaped 
by a network of transnational flows.  
I am, however, also interested in seeing the public discussion of the Sudan in 
terms of ideology. Of importance is David Armitage’s The Ideological Origins of the 
British Empire, an intellectual history of the idea of Empire as used by British thinkers 
from the middle sixteenth to the middle eighteenth centuries.  He argues that “Empire” 28
was used differently depending on the context. The bringing together of these various 
 Bernard Porter, The Absent-minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain, 26
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
 Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Colony and Metropole in the English Imagination, 27
1830-1867, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002). 
 David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge 28
University Press). 
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understandings of what “Empire” meant was taken for granted as a given by later 
thinkers such as John Seeley. For them, the British Protestant, laissez-faire, free, and 
maritime traditions were a comforting idea with no real analytic value.Thus, a false 
continuity of English dominance over Scots, Welsh, and Irish in Britain was combined 
with British dominance over colonial holdings.  
This view of a continuous Empire, was counter to the traditional view of a First 
and Second Empire. The First Empire encompassed the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries and the creation of an industrial Britain. The Second British Empire went from 
the late eighteenth century up to decolonization after the Second World War, in which 
Britain became a world military and economic power.  
But, approaching an ideological and cultural history of Britain also moves away 
from the economic explanations of early scholarship.  J.A. Hobson challenged this theory 
in his book Imperialism: a Study, published after the disastrous Boer War.  Hobson 29
argues that Britain’s imperialism was not driven by geo-politics but by the economic 
interest of capitalists. In a similar vein, V.I. Lenin’s Imperialism, The Highest Stage of 
Capitalism shared the critical anti-imperialism of Hobson, but with a materialistic 
interpretation of the economic nature of British imperialism.  By the 1950s Oxbridge 30
historians Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher would posit a more complex model of 
the British Empire.   31
 John Atkinson Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, (London: James Nisbett & Co., 1902). 29
 V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism, (London: Penguin, 2010).30
 Gallagher, John and Ronald Robinson. "The Imperialism of Free Trade," The Economic History 31
Review (August 1953) 6#1, 1–15.
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Robinson and Gallagher argued that the ministers in Whitehall were more 
interested in an informal imperialism of lassiez-faire to formal imperialism with its use 
of governing and occupying forces.The men of the colonial office were true believers in 
political economy, wanting to open territory and markets for commerce and trade. 
Indirect rule and gun boat diplomacy were not the ends but the mean of imperialism.  
The 1990s would see a revisionist view of Robinson and Gallagher challenged by 
P.J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins. They argued that the British bureaucracy was not 
autonomous but instead the tools of gentleman capitalists. The expansion of the Empire 
was steered by the gentry who were in charge of the purse in the City and had relations 
with the imperial government. Through the alliance of both capitalism and politics 
expansion was driven, not by true believers on the periphery of the Empire.  
What connects Hobson, Robinson and Gallagher, and Cain and Hopkins is their 
agreement that the expansion of the British Empire can best be interpreted by analyzing 
domestic economic interests. For Robinson and Gallagher the Imperial regime was used 
to make sure that financiers had free access to capital markets. Private and public sectors 
merged to use the power of the Empire’s political, military, and economic arsenal to 
ensure that commodities went to and from Britain and her dominions. 
Though this thesis will primarily focus on the metropole, it will be mindful of the 
racialist views of its subjects. Of importance in this aim is the scholarship in recent years 
on British colonialism inspired by literary theory and anthropology, which started to 
challenge the empirical assumptions of previous British Empire scholarship. Thinkers 
!14
like Michel Foucault  and Edward Said have proved important to this development. 
Timothy Mitchell’s Colonising Egypt is an example of the convergence and influence of 
Said’s Orientalism and Foucault’s modern surveillance state.  Colonialism created in 32
Egypt what could be readable to the European public, both as an Orientalist spectacle, 
and as a reform project within Modernity. Thus, Europeans visiting Egypt had mixed 
feelings about the place due to their inability to get a "vantage point" on Cairo, due to 
their inability to find its abjectness. 
 Therefore, the British had to create Egypt as an object in order to control it. This 
hegemonic view of the British vis a vis Egypt is complicated by Eve M. Troutt Powell’s 
A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the Mastery of the Sudan.  33
She argues that the colonizing of the Sudan by Egypt, a “colonized colonizer,” eliminates 
the binary view of the power between the colonized and the colonizer, and thus creates a 
much more fluid view of Imperialism. Powell’s work is part of a larger project by those 
working in Middle Eastern and Ottoman history pushing back against perceived notions 
of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Cemal Kafadar’s “The Question of Ottoman 
Decline” objected to the theory of decline. The theory creates a paradigm of decline vis a 
vis the modern west without any observational evidence.   34
 Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 32
 Eve Troutt Powell, A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the Master of 33
the Sudan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). 
 Cemal Kafadar, “The Question of Ottoman Decline,” in Harvard Middle East and Islamic 34
Review, 1999.
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However, many histories of the British in Africa focus more on actual British 
colonies, not areas that were only tangentially British. As Sudan was only under Britain 
as part of a condominium with Egypt, it does not receive the same level of attention as 
other British colonies. Sudan does, however, factor into these studies due to the British 
involvement there in 1885 and 1898. The other way that historians currently tackle the 
problem of Britain‘s involvement in Africa is by focusing specifically on only one aspect 
of its imperial project. Zine Magubane, for example, has worked on the colonial project 
in South Africa. Her work, including Bringing the Empire Home: Race, Class and 
Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa, focuses on life in Africa and how Africans 
are perceived in England.  Magubane’s studies on the Anglo-Boer War show the way 35
that a historical event in Africa, in this case the Boer War, was used to rally support for 
granting suffrage to women in London.   36
Historiography regarding the Scramble for Africa is likewise fruitful in framing 
this study. Robinson and Gallagher posited that the British presence in Egypt had less to 
do with economic concerns and more to do with wanting to protect British interests in 
the region, mainly the route to India.  Indigenous nationalism in Egypt in 1882 was the 37
catalyst for British expansion further into Africa, first in Uganda, then Kenya, and ending 
with the conquest of the Sudan in 1898. However, I agree with more recent scholarship 
 Zine Magubane, Bringing the Empire Home: Race, Class and Gender in Britain and Colonial 35
South Africa, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004). 
 Ibid. 36
 John E. Flin, “Britain and the Scramble for Africa,” The Oxford History of the British Empire: 37
Volume V: Historiography, ed. Robin Winks, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 457. 
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that has suggested that the start of colonization can be pushed back to 1875. With the 
push by Prime Minister Disraeli for a more active imperialism, one can view the 
Scramble of Africa in concert with military actions in Afghanistan, Egypt, the Zulu War, 
and South Africa.  
A more reactionary push back against Said and his Orientalism comes from 
David Cannadine’s Ornamentalism: How the British Saw their Empire.  Cannadine’s 38
thesis stipulates that the British strove to put in place a hierarchal and class system in 
their colonies that mirrored the system in place at home in Britain. This view plays down 
the role that race had in the Empire and its paternal approach to the non-white inhabitants 
of its colonies. Cannadine can thus be seen in the vein of recent more apologetic 
conservative scholarship on the Empire. Most famously is Niall Ferguson’s Empire: How 
Britain Made the Modern World  which seeks to explain how the Empire was a force of 
good for the world due to its imposition of free trade. .  39
 By exploring the intersection between the Sudan Campaign and the British 
public sphere, the present work responds to MacKenzie’s invitation for further inquiries 
into the intersection of Britain’s colonial wars and popular culture, as well as 
Thompson’s desire for attention to the impact that imperialism had on domestic politics 
and the empire’s role in shaping national identity.   Taking into account that Britishness, 40
 David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw their Empire, (Oxford: Oxford 38
University Press, 2001). 
 Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, (New York: Basic Books, 39
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as discussed by Linda Colley, Keith Robbins, Richard Weight, and Robert Colls, was and 
continues to be a construction that has existed above, and as a composite of, English, 
Scottish, Irish, and Welsh identities, it is only fitting to assess the British relationship 
with the empire along those lines.   Indeed, while those communities almost certainly 41
had a common point of reference in regards to the imperial wars and their repercussions, 
it is also highly likely that responses would not have been uniform, and that they would 
have been perceived differently and possibly co-opted for entirely different purposes and 
ends, depending on regional allegiances within the British polity. 
 In the subsequent chapters this thesis traces the unfolding events in Sudan as the 
press and media expounded on Britain’s proper response. Chapter 2 looks at the political 
debate surrounding New Imperialism. Conservative and Liberal attitudes toward empire 
affected policy, resulting in a British presence in Egypt and the Sudan. These attitudes 
would then affect how the government responded to the situation on the ground with the 
Mahdi and Charles Gordon. The resulting push for Gordon to go to Khartoum, and the 
response to his death is explored in Chapter 3. Here I argue that the activist press led by 
W.T. Stead fueled pressure on the Gladstone government to sending Gordon to 
Khartoum, then pressuring the government in efforts to save him. The reaction of grief  
to his death, combined with his previous elevation in the pages of newspapers across 
Britain would help fuel the heroic image of Gordon. The final chapter looks at the wider 
media of literature, journals, and treasure of conquest to explore how the romanticization 
of empire coalesced around events in the Sudan. This larger media landscape fed off the 
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popularization of Gordon and the zeal of reporters for action, but also used the imperial 
imaginary to reinforce larger notions of individuals role in the larger Empire. Thus, the 
Sudan Campaign and its representations within the larger print culture was a vessel for a 
larger debate on the British Empire itself.  
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CHAPTER 2. THE SUDAN CAMPAIGN 
 The European powers engaged in a dogged pursuit of territorial possessions 
during the late nineteenth century, particularly in Africa and Asia. This “New 
Imperialism,” as it has since been known, established British rule and influence in non-
European regions of the world. The 1875 purchase of the Egyptian Suez Canal by 
Benjamin Disraeli was the catalyst for this new pursuit of empire for empire’s sake. This 
"New Imperialism" caused push back by Liberals such as Disraeli's nemesis William 
Gladstone. Gladstone saw imperialism in Africa as folly, and thus fought its expansion. 
These two visions of Britain would forge Britain and Charles Gordon into conflict in 
Egypt and the Sudan.  
 In this chapter I argue that the Sudan Campaign was representative of the greater 
Victorian adventures situated around the differing conservative and liberal positions 
surrounding “New Imperialism.” Starting with the political feud between Disraeli and 
Gladstone the events in the Sudan were both the result of and a catalyst for the debate 
between proponents of  “Little England” and “Big England.” The former wanting a less 
imperial Britain, the latter wanting to grow Britain’s imperial presence. 
 Thus, the Big England policies of Disraeli, including the purchase of the Suez 
Canal, would lead to an outsize British presence in Egypt and by proxy the Sudan. This 
presence expatriated tensions within the Sudan towards their foreign rulers, creating the 
rise of the Mahdi and the need for British intervention to evacuate the city of Khartoum. 
The desire of the British public for Charles Gordon to lead this evacuation would come 
!20
head to head with the Little England mentality of Gladstone, ultimately ending in 
tragedy.  
2.1 The Veiled Protectorate 
 In the nineteenth century capitalist industrialization and nationalism fueled the 
subjugation of non-European lands. The British Empire alone accounted for over a 
quarter of the world’s land mass and people. The conquest of Africa during the 1880s 
provides the clearest example of the “New Imperialism” that would continue into the 
twentieth century. The so-called “Dark Continent” was explored and colonized by the 
British starting in Egypt and eventually working south to the Cape colony.  
 The area of Egypt, the Red Sea and the Sudan north of Equatoria was technically 
under the control of the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. However, by the mid-nineteenth 
century, this area of Africa was effectively an autonomous region under the purview of 
the Khedive of Egypt. The Khedive by the 1870s was in significant debt.  The British, 42
who had a vested interest in preserving the Ottoman Empire to protect British interests in 
the region, bought the Khedive’s shares in the Suez Canal in 1875. Thus, a "veiled 
protectorate" was created in which the Egyptian state was on paper self-ruling, but in 
reality the British through Sir Evelyn Barring were in charge.  This “veiled 43
protectorate” lead by the British led to a military intervention on behalf of the Khedive. 
The first intervention was the suppression of the  Mehemet Tawfiq Pasha army rebellion 
of 1881-1882, and the second was the Sudan Campaign of 1884.  
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Having assumed responsibility for Egypt the British were additionally burdened 
with overseeing the Sudan.  Annexed by Egypt in 1821, the Sudan had been in open 
rebellion since 1881.  That revolt was led by Muhammad Ahmad, the son of a Sudanese 
boat builder, who proclaimed himself the Mahdi (the Expected One), who called for a 
jihad against Turkish rule.  Over the next two years, the movement gained strength.  
Defeating size able Egyptian armies that were sent against it, the Mahdi’s forces 
contributed to and benefited from the instability caused by the Arabi revolt.   With his 44
government propped up by the British military, Tewfik sought to reassert control over the 
Sudan and eliminate the Mahdi threat to Upper Egypt.  In early 1883, therefore, he 
dispatched an Egyptian army of 10,000 men, many of whom were survivors of Arabi’s 
army at Tel-el-Kebir.  The army was officered by British soldiers and commanded by 
Colonel William Hicks, who was a veteran of the Indian Army and, in being hired by the 
khedive, was elevated to the rank of general.  After drilling and training his army for 
several months in Omdurman, Hicks had succeeded in clearing Mahdists from the region 
between the White and Blue Niles by the end of May 1883.  Encouraged by these results 
Tewfik and his ministers sought to reassert Egyptian control over Kordofan, a region that 
lay southwest of the capital at Khartoum.  Gladstone, Baring and other British officials 
opposed such a move, because they feared the financial strain a Sudanese dependency 
might put on the weakened Egyptian state.  However, because the British were preparing 
to turn over full control of Egypt to the khedive, including drawing down their military 
presence there, and because they wanted no part in the Sudan question, they chose to 
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refrain as much as possible from interfering in the matter.  Leaving Omdurman on 8 
September with a force numbering close to 10,000 men, Hicks’s expedition into 
Kordofan met with disaster on 5 November.  Abushed at El Obeid, Hicks’s force was 
almost completely annihilated.      45
This defeat left 32,000 Egyptian soldiers cut off in garrisons in Khartoum, 
Sennar, and other places.  When news of the disaster reached London about two weeks 
later, it immediately raised questions about Egypt’s long-term presence in the Sudan and 
forced the cabinet to reconsider Britain’s Egyptian policy.  Prompted by General 
Wolseley, Hartington as war secretary argued that Britain was bound to support Egypt in 
retaining control over Khartoum and its surrounding regions for the sake of preserving 
British prestige and protecting the route to India,. At the same time, he believed that it 
was reasonable that Egypt be persuaded to evacuate from the provinces of Kordofan, 
Darfur, and Fashoda, which lacked strategic importance.   Gladstone concurred with 46
Baring, who had recently been named British consul-general, that it would be impossible 
for Egypt to hold on to even those limited sectors of the Sudan without British 
assistance.   Lord Northbrook soon agreed that it would be impossible for Egypt to 47
retain control over its southern neighbor on its own and that the operation was too costly 
for the Turks or Britain to pursue.   But when Baring advised the khedive in early 48
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December to abandon the territory south of Aswan, Tewfik’s ministers summarily 
resigned rather than take responsibility for relinquishing Egyptian territory.  Bankrupt 
and with his army destroyed, the khedive was powerless to defend his own borders let 
alone to withdraw from the Sudan without assistance.  Recognizing the situation, the 
cabinet was obliged to assume responsibility for the protection of Egypt proper and the 
Red Sea coast.   The political effect of this decision was that instead of advancing the 49
process of granting Egypt its independence, British oversight was all the more 
formalized.  The khedive was relegated, for all intents and purposes, to the status of a 
puppet ruler, with the real decision-making power residing in Baring’s hands.      50
The task of evacuating more than 33,000 Egyptian troops and civilians out of the 
Sudan fell to Major General Charles “Chinese” Gordon.   A fervent Christian who 51
avidly supported charitable and humanitarian causes, Gordon had previously served as 
governor general of Equatoria and the Sudan under Khedive Ismail in the 1870s, and he 
had used his position to suppress the slave trade.  52
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On February 18, 1885, British officials sent Major General Gordon to Khartoum 
as Governor-General for the Sudan for the second time in his career.  Under the 53
authority of the Egyptian Khedive, Gordon was ordered to end Egyptian rule in the 
Sudan, evacuate soldiers, officials, and their families, and make the Sudan a self-
governing polity. Prime Minster William Gladstone saw Gordon's role as retreat and 
abandonment from the Sudan, and saw no need for a military presence in the Sudanese 
interior.   54
Gordon's commitment to what he was  a mandate for a form of self-government 
in the Sudan would led to public cries for British troops to help the General in his noble 
mission led by Conservatives, the press, Secretary of State for War, the Adjutant General, 
and everyday citizens. By 1885, the Gordon Relief effort was sent to the Sudan, however 
it would be too late. Gordon would be found by relief forces dead, his severed head on a 
spike. Gordon would become a martyr of the Empire, the embodiment of the "stiff upper 
lip" of Victorian Imperials and an example of moral character. But the arguments 
between politicians and officials leading up to his death belied the arguments of the role 
of Empire and the British in the world.   
2.2 Gladstone versus Disraeli 
The views of the Empire and foreign policy surrounded the two big figures of 
Victorian politics- Benjamin Disraeli and William Gladstone. Gladstone was skeptical of  
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foreign entanglements and was a proponent of "rights for the savage."  Disraeli strove to 55
preserve the Empire using the principles of "Tory Democracy."  Key to his preservation 56
effort was India, the so-called "jewel" of the British Empire. To this end Disraeli 
purchased the four million pounds worth of Suez Canal shares..  This move prevented 57
France form taking control of a vital trade route, making shipping from or to India and 
the Far East cheaper. Gladstone claimed the purchase would give way to the military 
occupation of Egypt. A prediction that would be proved correct. However, Disraeli was 
primarily concerned with protecting British economic strength.  
For Gladstone, imperialism meant more burdens on British taxpayers and more 
risks of war: 
Consider how we have conquered, planted, annexed, and appreciated at all the points of 
the compass, so that at four point on the surface of the earth there not some region or 
some spot of British domain at hand. Nor even from their for points are we about…and 
then I ask you what quarrel can arise between two countries or what war, in which you 
may not, if you do so minded, to set up British interests as a ground of interference.  
This view was consistent with those liberals associated with the Manchester School. This 
group was derided as "Little Englanders" for their desire for less Empire and more 
investment at home and in the colonial possessions that Britain already was responsible 
for.  (Big Englander was used for those in favor of more imperialism). This "Little 58
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England" perspective on Imperialism would inform how Gladstone dealt with the crisis 
in Sudan and the Gordon affair.  
In April 1885, Sudan was superseded as the utmost area of imperial concern to 
the British government. Instead, there was an incident in Afghanistan, which was under 
limited autonomous rule and regarded as a buffer-zone by the British and the Russians. 
Gladstone feared that this incident would lead conflict between the two empires and 
recalled the troops from Wolseley‘s expedition back to Egypt in anticipation of their 
having to be sent to Afghanistan. The situation would not lead to war, as it was quickly 
diffused by the Afghan leader, but the troop recall remained in effect.  Due to the recall 59
of soldiers, Britain would not become involved in Sudan again under Gladstone. The 
Mahdi‘s death in June 1885, which led to an internal crisis in the country, only cemented 
the region‘s lack of importance.  60
2.3 The Sudan Campaign 
Having assumed responsibility for Egypt—however reluctantly—Gladstone’s 
administration was additionally burdened with overseeing the Sudan.  Annexed by Egypt 
in 1821, the Sudan had been in open rebellion since 1881.  That revolt led by 
Muhammad Ahmad, the son of a Sudanese boat builder, who proclaimed himself the 
Mahdi (the Expected One), who called for a jihad against Turkish rule.  Over the next 
two years, the movement gained strength.  Defeating size able Egyptian armies that were 
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sent against it, the Mahdi’s forces contributed to and benefited from the instability 
caused by the Arabi revolt.   With his government propped up by the British military, 61
Tewfik sought to reassert control over the Sudan and eliminate the Mahdi threat to Upper 
Egypt.  In early 1883, therefore, he dispatched an Egyptian army of 10,000 men, many 
of whom were survivors of Arabi’s army at Tel-el-Kebir.  The army was officered by 
British soldiers and commanded by Colonel William Hicks, who was a veteran of the 
Indian Army and, in being hired by the khedive, was elevated to the rank of general.  
After drilling and training his army for several months in Omdurman, Hicks had 
succeeded in clearing Mahdists from the region between the White and Blue Niles by the 
end of May 1883.  
  Encouraged by these results Tewfik and his ministers sought to reassert Egyptian 
control over Kordofan, a region that lay southwest of the capital at Khartoum.  
Gladstone, Baring and other British officials opposed such a move, because they feared 
the financial strain a Sudanese dependency might put on the weakened Egyptian state.  
However, because the British were preparing to turn over full control of Egypt to the 
khedive, including drawing down their military presence there, and because they wanted 
no part in the Sudan question, they chose to refrain as much as possible from interfering 
in the matter.  Leaving Omdurman on 8 September with a force numbering close to 
10,000 men, Hicks’s expedition into Kordofan met with disaster on 5 November.  
Ambushed at El Obeid, Hicks’s force was almost completely annihilated.      62
 Robin Neillands, The Dervish Wars: Gordon and Kitchener in the Sudan, 1880-1898  (London: 61
John Murray, 1996), 59-67.  
 Michael Barthorp, Blood-Red Desert Sand: The British Invasion of Egypt and the Sudan, 62
1882-1898 (London: Cassel, 1984), 79-80. 
!28
This defeat left 32,000 Egyptian soldiers cut off in garrisons in Khartoum, 
Sennar, and other places.  When news of the disaster reached London about two weeks 
later, it immediately raised questions about Egypt’s long-term presence in the Sudan and 
forced the cabinet to reconsider Britain’s Egyptian policy.  Prompted by General 
Wolseley, Hartington as war secretary argued that Britain was bound to support Egypt in 
retaining control over Khartoum and its surrounding regions for the sake of preserving 
British prestige and protecting the route to India,. At the same time, he believed that it 
was reasonable that Egypt be persuaded to evacuate from the provinces of Kordofan, 
Darfur, and Fashoda, which lacked strategic importance.    63
Gladstone concurred with Baring, who had recently been named British consul-
general, that it would be impossible for Egypt to hold on to even those limited sectors of 
the Sudan without British assistance.   Lord Northbrook soon agreed that it would be 64
impossible for Egypt to retain control over its southern neighbor on its own and that the 
operation was too costly for the Turks or Britain to pursue.   But when Baring advised 65
the khedive in early December to abandon the territory south of Aswan, Tewfik’s 
ministers summarily resigned rather than take responsibility for relinquishing Egyptian 
territory.  Bankrupt and with his army destroyed, the khedive was powerless to defend 
his own borders let alone to withdraw from the Sudan without assistance.  Recognizing 
the situation, the cabinet was obliged to assume responsibility for the protection of Egypt 
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proper and the Red Sea coast.   The political effect of this decision was that instead of 66
advancing the process of granting Egypt its independence, British oversight was all the 
more formalized.  The khedive was relegated, for all intents and purposes, to the status 
of a puppet ruler, with the real decision-making power residing in Baring’s hands.      67
The task of evacuating more than 33,000 Egyptian troops and civilians out of the 
Sudan fell to Major General Charles “Chinese” Gordon.   A fervent Christian who 68
avidly supported charitable and humanitarian causes, Gordon had previously served as 
governor general of Equatoria and the Sudan under Khedive Ismail in the 1870s, and he 
had used his position to suppress the slave trade.    
There were initially significant reservations about sending Gordon, both in  
London and in Cairo. At the time he agreed to accept the cabinet’s offer to go to the 
Sudan in mid-January 1884, Gordon had already resigned his commission in the British 
army to accept a contract with King Leopold of Belgium to eradicate the Afro-Arab 
slave trade in the Congo.   Aware of Gordon’s tendency to interpret his orders to serve 69
his own convictions, Gladstone was wary about giving him the power to act on his own 
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and preferred that he be given only advisory responsibilities.   In fact, Sir Edward 70
Walter Hamilton, Gladstone’s personal secretary, recorded that “[Gordon] seems to be a 
half-cracked fatalist; and what can one expect from such a man?”   Meanwhile, Baring 71
had initially opposed the appointment of Gordon or any other British officer for that 
matter, but he also believed that the Egyptians were incapable of administering the 
situation, which called for both an advisory and an executive functionary.  At the urging 
of his military advisors--some of whom had served previously with Gordon--Baring 
became convinced that Gordon was the only officer suitable to effect the evacuation of 
the Sudan.     72
  Gordon met with a select cabinet committee comprised of Hartington, Granville, 
Dilke, and Northbrook to finalize his commission on January 18.  The committee offered 
potentially conflicting instructions to him.  The members told Gordon to proceed to the 
Sudan in an advisory capacity and to “report on the best way of withdrawing garrisons, 
settling the country, and to perform other duties as may be entrusted to him by the 
khedive’s government” through Baring.   Gladstone was notably absent from that final 73
meeting, as he was resting at his home in Hawarden, and his absence may well have 
contributed to his subsequent befuddlement over Gordon’s actions and his persistent 
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belief that Gordon had only been given at most advisory responsibilities.  “We sent 
Gordon on a mission of peace and liberation,” he later wrote. “I never understood how it 
was that Gordon’s mission of peace became one of war.”   As Elton notes in his account 74
of Gordon’s commissioning, Hartington’s report to Gladstone made no mention of the 
reference to Gordon being authorized to perform “other duties.”  Consequently, 
Gladstone, who intended from the onset that Gordon only be sent in an advisory 
capacity, remained convinced that Gordon embarked on nothing more than a fact-finding 
and advisory mission.106    
Gordon, however, understood his orders to be executive in nature.  Recounting 
his meeting with the ministers to his sister Augusta the following day, he wrote:   
Wolseley came for me, I went with him and saw Granville, Hartington, Dilke, and 
Northbrook; they said had I seen W. and did I understand their ideas.  I said yes, and 
repeated what W. had said to me as to their ideas, which was ‘they would evacuate 
Sudan.’  They were pleased and said, that was their idea.  Would I go?  I said ‘yes.’    
They said ‘when?’  I said, ‘To-night.’ And it was over.    75
  
Immediately following his meeting with the cabinet ministers, Gordon, accompanied by 
Lt. Col. J. D. H. Stewart as his staff officer, departed for Egypt by way of the evening 
boat-train to Calais.  They arrived in Port Said on 24 January.    
 As the Mahdi grew stronger, Gordon became more isolated in Khartoum and 
getting messages through to him became much harder, leaving him to work in a more 
autonomous fashion. Before the Mahdi took the area directly surrounding Gordon, there 
was communication between Khartoum and London, even if it was infrequent. 
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Afterwards, Gordon was essentially alone in Khartoum with his Egyptian troops. He had 
no idea what his home government wished him to do and no idea if any help or 
reinforcements were coming to his aid. Soon, Gordon and his few troops were under 
siege in Khartoum and his local government was effectively out of money, but he was 
unwilling to leave the country to the Mahdi.    76
 This state of siege would last until the end of Gordon‘s life. He would not receive 
much meaningful communication from the British government, nor would he know 
whether an expedition to aid him would reach him in time. By December 1884, he 
realized that the relief expedition he had long sought, which would be led by Lord 
Garnet Wolsely with the assistance of General Gerald Graham, would probably not reach 
him in time. At the close of the journal he kept during his solitary occupation, he wrote 
his farewells to his fellow officers, acknowledging his frustration with not knowing if he 
would be rescued, and finally closing with an acceptance that there was nothing he could 
do about it: "but this is spilt milk,"he wrote, "Good bye."  Charles George Gordon 77
would be dead a month later, still attempting to hold Khartoum. 
The expedition continued until the already-discussed international developments 
forced the end of it in May 1885. This end, which was marked by one final transmission 
from Wolseley, had a mixed result at best. The Mahdi had not been smashed. The British 
withdrew to save face, and Wolseley‘s previous reputation for military excellence was 
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diminished. His final dispatch also highlighted the hard work of the men who 
participated in his expedition and the fact that the failure was not their fault. As the 
concluding lines of his telegram state, "No one can regret more than I do the fall of that 
place, but in common with all my countrymen I look back with pride to the gallant 
struggle made by our troops to save Khartum and its heroic defender."  Like Kitchener, 78
Wolseley was also able to express his personal feelings in the official report of the 
expedition, and thus, was able to salute his troops as well as express his own discomfort 
with the way his mission was ended. 
2.4 Aftermath 
If Gordon had not been a celebrity in the British Empire, discussions about the 
expedition would have probably ended with the Wolseley dispatch quoted above, but he 
was not an average man. In London, his death was greeted with an outpouring of grief in 
all levels of society. Furthermore, it was a contentious issue in Parliament and even in 
Gladstone‘s own cabinet. Although Gordon‘s death did not directly bring down the 
government, it can be credited with turning the public opinion away from the Liberal 
Party in general and Gladstone in particular. The long shadow of Gordon‘s death would 
still be present in imperial decisions until the end of Britain‘s involvement in Sudan, 
which did not occur until almost a century later. He would be invoked by those who 
supported continued imperial expansion; however, his death would also be used by those 
who wished to curtail the empire. In discussions of the final withdrawal, Gordon‘s 
sacrifice is referenced, nearly sixty years after the original events occurred. 
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Regardless of the reasons why Gordon was not rescued in time, disbelief 
followed by grief was the dominant emotion among members of the British government. 
Even Gladstone, whose actions had directly led to delays in the expedition reaching 
Gordon, was dismayed to hear that he had died. Some members of the government were 
more vocal about the death than others; some took more accountability for their actions 
than others; but all felt the need to acknowledge Gordon‘s passing.    
Like her ministers, the Queen was very distraught over Gordon's passing. Her 
attitude towards Gordon, a man whom she would later commemorate by having his bible 
occupy a place of honor in her home, comes through in the letter that she wrote to 
various members of the government about his all-too-preventable death.  To show this 79
anger publicly, the Queen took the extraordinary step of telegraphing both her Prime 
Minister and Secretary of War en clair. By sending her feelings on the matter in a non-
ciphered telegram, the Queen basically announced to anyone who was reading the 
telegrams, including members of the press, that she blamed the government and was 
displeased with how her ministers had handled the crisis.  This displeasure is also seen 80
in the Queen's other correspondence. Her letter to Spencer Cavendish, the Marquess of 
Hartington and the Secretary of State for War, is only one example of her feelings about 
the conditions that led to the fall of Khartoum: "to think that all this might have been 
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prevented & many precious lives saved by earlier action is too fearful."  This letter to 81
Hartington is only one example of Victoria‘s grief, anger, and dismay, but she did not 
excoriate Gladstone for his role in the crisis. Her more vitriolic comments were reserved 
for the eyes of her Private Secretary, Sir Henry Ponsonby, with whom she had reams of 
daily correspondence. In these notes, Victoria did not temper her anger against the Prime 
Minister whom she only grudgingly accepted, nor did she shy away from placing all of 
the blame for the situation on Gladstone and his government. To Ponsonby she wrote, 
"Mr. Gladstone and the Government have...Gordon‘s innocent, noble, heroic blood on 
their consciences. No one who reflects on how he was sent out, how he was refused, can 
deny it! It is awful!"    82
Like most of her subjects, their Queen blamed the government for Gordon‘s 
abandonment; unlike most of her subjects, however, she was able to reach out directly to 
the government and demand accountability regarding its actions. She did so in a direct 
note to Gladstone the day after the news of Khartoum‘s fall reached London. In this note, 
Victoria outlined the two courses of action that the government must take. Logically, the 
first was to ascertain if Gordon was alive or dead. The second contained a barely-veiled 
reference to Gladstone‘s indecision regarding the relief expedition: "the Cabinet will 
promptly agree to a bold and decided course. Hesitation and half measures would be 
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disastrous."  From these selections, it is evident that the Queen was personally affected 83
by Gordon‘s death. It is also clear that she was not willing to believe that his death was 
merely a result of a bad policy action. As her letter of condolence to the Gordon family 
stated, the Queen keenly felt Gordon‘s death, a death that she felt left a permanent "stain 
upon England."   84
This frequent desire to die for the Sudanese people was one of the points that 
Gladstone in particular, and the government in general, was quick to use to justify their 
decision. The War  Office and Cabinet‘s opinion of Gordon, already discussed, indicated 
that the official feeling on Gordon's choice to remain in Khartoum was that as it was his 
decision not to leave with the last steamers, the final result was at least partially his fault. 
The fact that the relief expedition did not reach him in time was really just a failure of 
planning and hence not a direct decision to abandon him to his fate. Following this line 
of argument, it is understandable that Gladstone, when the news about the fall of 
Khartoum reached London, still chose to attend a play that night. His journal entry for 
that night, February 10, does not mention Gordon. Instead, he merely commented on the 
play, “The Candidate,” which Gladstone noted was “capitally acted.”  At the time, he 85
was vilified in the press for continuing to enjoy himself when the fate of Gordon was not 
yet known to the public. However, following the logic that the government was 
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employing, Gladstone did not consider his actions to be inappropriate, especially as he 
was already aware that Gordon‘s death was almost a certainty because he had already 
stated as much in a letter to  Hartington three days previously.     86
  Many other members of the government were dismayed about the death of 
Gordon. In the official memorandum of the government and in their personal papers, 
members of Gladstone‘s Cabinet, including Hartington and Lord Granville, the Foreign 
Secretary, expressed their sadness at the expedition‘s failure. Gordon's death was not 
anticipated. There were no contingency plans for what the government was going to do if 
he was killed in Sudan, nor was there a plan for how to replace Gordon at Khartoum. 
When the government was faced with having to solve these problems, the utter failure to 
take any of these details into account became known, leading many members of the 
government to turn further against Gladstone and his administration. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The disaster that was the Gordon Relief was fueled in part by outside pressure 
from the press on the politicians in Whitehall charged with administrating the quagmire 
that was the Protectorate of Egypt. Gladstone’s “Little England” approach to imperialism 
confronted through the Sudan Campaign the consequences that Disraeli’s  “Big England” 
policies had wrought. This political debate between liberal anti-interventionists and 
conservative interventionists initially coalesced around the campaign for Gordon for 
Khartoum. As I will show in the next chapter, this campaign, and later debates in the 
press around the government’s reaction to events in Khartoum,  would plant the 
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necessary seeds to create a cult of personality and martyrdom of  Charles “Chinese” 
Gordon.  
!39
CHAPTER 3. THE ACTIVIST PRESS 
Since the 18th century, upper and upper-middle classes had consumed 
newspapers. By the time Gordon‘s final saga began, the popular press was undergoing a 
transformation and embracing a new audience: the lower-middle and working classes. 
Gordon‘s mission, abandonment, and eventual death were the type of story that newer 
newspapers thrived upon. The "Gordon affair" was exactly the form of sensation that this 
medium needed to increase its market share. By the end of the nineteenth century 
newspapers as varied as the Conservative-Party-supporting Daily Mail and the Liberal-
leaning Reynold’s News were covering imperial events, including Queen Victoria‘s 
jubilee and several smaller imperial wars in Africa. Gordon‘s death was only one 
sensationalistic imperial event during this time, but it was among the earliest to appeal to 
this new type of New Journalism.    
Due to the outsize affect and availability of these newspapers, popular opinion 
and sentiment could more easily be swayed and appealed to. W.T. Stead of the Pall Mall 
Gazette was influential on not just the genre of journalism he employed, but on 
promoting political action by appealing to the sentiments of the people. His interview 
with Charles Gordon would kickstart the movement to send Gordon to Khartoum, and 
would create the cult of personality surrounding the General. In this chapter I argue that 
the situation in Khartoum became a daily drama that played out in the British press, thus 
affecting political debate between conservatives and liberals on the proper role of Britain 
in the Sudan that mirrored larger debates on Imperialism on the whole. The subsequent 
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debates would create a ripe situation in which Gordon would become a heroic figure, 
whose appeal intensified after his death and martyrdom, spurred on by an activist press.  
3.1 W.T. Stead and Gordon 
We have had opportunities of observing a new journalism which a clever and 
energetic man has lately invented- Matthew Arnold, “Up to Easter” 
The editor of the Pall Mall Gazette W.T. Stead coined the phrase “New 
Journalism” to describe his new approach of activist journalism. For Stead his “mission 
was to labour…[for] the social regeneration of the world.”  Under Stead’s leadership the 87
Gazette went from Tom Arnold’s “Old Journalism”, whose long-term project was to 
elevate journalistic practice into “‘criticism’ and thus to the authority literature” to a 
Liberal and Radical paper.  Arnold’s “Old Journalism” concentrated primarily in in the 88
1850s through the 1870s was aimed at high minded audiences (those in power). Thus, it 
struck an air of anonymity when possible, and strove to straddle both the left and right 
positions.  This middle ground allowed these newspapers to speak on issues with an air 89
of authority.  
Stead in 1885 cemented this new approach in his series “Maiden Tribute of 
Modern Babylon,” in which he would purchase a child virgin for the purposes of an 
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expose lambasting prostitution in London. The sensational article would reach one 
hundred thousand copies in sales and notoriety. But, Stead’s approach to a journalism of 
advocacy would be put in to use in his articles on Gordon in the Sudan.  
Stead was friends with Gordon and with his article and interview with Gordon 
would spearhead the press movement to send Gordon to Khartoum. The title for the 
article “Chinese Gordon for the Soudan” would become the catchphrase for the pro-
Gordon campaign.  In the article, Stead set Gordon up in opposition to Sir Evelyn 90
Barring and his policies. Barring and the government wanted to evacuate the Sudan 
while Gordon equates “evacuation” with “massacre.”  Stead agreed with Good that “to 91
hold on to Khartoum as hard as we can and as long as we can, and trust to time and tribal 
jealousies to open as a way of escape for the integral garrison.”  In other words Gordon 92
and Stead wanted the British forces to stay in Khartoum to extricate the European forces 
stationed in the Sudanese capital.  
Stead saw the relief of the Sudan forces as the way to evacuation similar to how 
the British “relived Candahar before we evacuated Afghanistan.”  Gordon as a great 93
Englishmen and expert dealing with the region would be for Stead the perfect man to 
send “out with carte blance.”  Stead’s interview with Gordon revealed Gordon’s belief 94
that a victory of the Muslim Mahdi would embolden the Muslim peoples of Egypt to rise 






up. He feared that fellow Muslims especially the Turks would be forced to confront the 
uprisings creating a zero sum game. The British could “either surrender absolutely to the 
Mahdi or defend Khartoum at all hazards.”  95
Gordon viewed the leadership in Egypt as corrupt and unable to rule effectively. 
It was Gordon who was the father-like savior of the Sudanese. “I taught them something 
of the meaning of liberty and justice.”  The Egypt under the corruption of the Turks 96
were oppressive and plunderers of the Sudanese people. The followers of the Mahdi then 
are not religiously motivated, instead they are angry at the Egyptian-Turkish authorities 
and their corruption. Under the leadership of someone like Nubar, “the one supremely 
able awn among Egyptian Ministers,” a capable British Governor-General could be put 
in leadership.   97
Of course part of the Sudanese anger was that the Egyptian-Turkish officials 
would appoint non-Muslims like Gordon to high positions. This anger was wrapped in 
religious sentiment as the Sufi Sudanese were in opposition to the “dry, scholastic Islam 
of Egyptian officaldom.”  Gordon in his haste to attach the moral savior to himself and 98
other well meaning British officials is blind to the problems that the British presence has 
added to the rise of the Mahdi.  
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Despite the illuminating interview is insightful in understanding the motives of 
Gordon, it can be viewed as propaganda as well. Stead later in his career would write on 
interviewing and remarked that the advice of his first interview subject should be 
followed by journalists:  
First, no interview should ever be published until the proof or the MS. has been 
submitted to the person interviewed for his correction; and, secondly, the fact that the 
interview has been read before its publication by the interviewed should never be 
revealed to the world, otherwise an interview which was known to have been revised 
by the person interviewed would be almost as compromising to him as if he had written 
a signed article or made a public speech.  99
Stead presented Gordon’s views without comment and with only the answers to 
Stead’s questions. Along with Stead’s “Chinese Gordon for the Soudan” the reader is 
presented with the case for intervention in Khartoum and the greater Sudan as a check 
against Muslim uprising in Egypt and the Muslim world. The popularity of Stead’s case 
for Gordon and his interview would bang the drum for Gordon’s being sent to Khartoum 
despite the misgivings of officials like Barring. Stead would use his popularity as a 
journalist to create a sort of cult of personality around Gordon as the man poised to save 
the Sudanese and serve England’s purpose there.  
In Stead’s article for The Century Quarterly on Gordon and how his life had 
prepared him for his mission to the Sudan. The article begins with Gordon’s exploits in 
China twenty-one years earlier where he earned the moniker “Chinese.” Stead equates 
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the suppression of the rebels under Chung-Wang to the Sudanese and the Mahdi. 
Because Gordon was successful in defeating the Chinese he of course could then beat the 
Sudanese, an equation that pits Gordon as the civilizer of non-white peoples.  
Next, Stead pivots to Gordon’s 1877 placement as Governor General in the 
“Soudan, or the Black Country.”  Egypt is shown as the oppressive state over the 100
Sudanese people. The “Egyptian government…accompanied by the torture of men and 
the ravishing of women.”  The Egyptians are presented as Turkish-Circassian predators 101
going after the innocent and childlike Sudanese. Gordon is then shown as the enemy of 
the corruption and the Egyptian status quo. He quotes Gordon as proclaiming that 
“Nevermore…will Egypt be able to govern the Soudan in the old Turkish or Circassian 
fashion after I have resided there long enough to teach the people that they have 
rights.”  Under Gordon, the  White English Savior, Sudan was improved.  102
However, in Gordon’s view, because Egypt’s Khedive did not elect a new 
Governor-General who would continue Gordon’s work. To Stead, “Egypt has lost the 
Soudan exactly as he predicted.”  Because the English steady hand had left Khartoum, 103
chaos and corruption was let back in. For Gordon he had “laid the egg…which the 
Mahdi has hatched.” Because Gordon exposed the corruption of the Egyptian rulers, the 
Mahdi has been able to use that corruption to support his cause and gain followers.  






All of this history then explains how successful Gordon will be in his new job in 
the Soudan Campaign in the eyes of Stead. Gordon’s main role is to evacuate Sudan and 
its 20,000 Egyptian troops, employees, native Christians, women, and children. Steed 
sees the Egyptian government as giving Gordon “discretion” to use troops if need be.  104
Furthermore, Gordon believes that “Her Majesty’s Government will give me the support 
and consideration” in his aim to pacify Khartoum.  Stead thus believes that Gordon 105
was the Victorian King Arthur with “the faith of Cromwell, to serve England in the 
Soudan,” who will commit England to an expedition to Khartoum which will lay the 
foundations of an African India.  106
The day after the interview appeared papers around the country reprinted portions 
of the scoop and discussed Gordon’s assessment of the strategic situation in the Sudan.   107
In Maryport on 10 January, at a crowded Liberal meeting that was meant to affirm 
confidence in the leadership of the party and return Liberal MPs to parliament, Sir 
Wilfred Lawson utilized Gordon’s critique to heap condemnation on the premier for 
entering Egypt in the first place and for disgracefully “enslaving” the Sudan., He pledged 
“to do everything in his power to get the troops out of Egypt.”   While it paid tribute to 108
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opinion expressed with regard to the Egyptian crisis by General Gordon,” the Daily 
News stood firmly behind Gladstone’s decision to withdraw from Sudan and dismissed 
the persistent accusations that the government’s decisions were continuing to lead to a 
“loss of prestige.”  To that end, the papers stressed to their readers that Gordon’s 
statements were a warning against abandoning the Sudan rashly, but that they were not, 
per se, directed against an orderly withdrawal.141  Concurring with the government’s 
decision to make Wadi Halfa the southern boundary of Egypt, the Bristol Mercury 
rejected Gordon’s contention that an abrupt extraction was unadvisable when it 
maintained that the garrison at Khartoum “at present could be withdrawn without 
danger.”   Such responses were not limited to the Liberal papers. Taking issue with a 109
Sheffield politician who advocated sending 30,000 British troops into the Sudan to crush 
the Mahdi and then marching on to Madagascar to flush out the French, the Sheffield and 
Rotherham Independent declared: “This…is what Tory journalism means when it insists 
upon the government protecting British interests and the prestige and honour of England 
in Egypt and the Sudan.”  The only sound course of action, the paper determined, was 
that which the government had already resolved to do, the withdrawal from the South 
and Western Sudan to Wadi Halfa.    110
From the perspective of the Conservative and independent presses, which 
seemingly took Gordon’s warnings more seriously, a military expedition to extract the 
garrisons or to defend Britain’s position in the Sudan, was simply the responsible and 
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necessary course of action.  Claiming that the European papers widely perceived 
Gladstone’s withdrawal from Sudan to be a sign of weakness, the Hampshire Advertiser 
exhaustively argued that it was impossible to conclude otherwise since their suppositions 
were supported by experts such as Baker and Gordon.  The Advertiser went on to 
observe regretfully that in the long run the cabinet’s “humiliating policy would hardly 
settle the crisis.”144    
Although many Conservative papers did not mention Gordon directly, their 
arguments were consistent with what he had advocated in his interview with Stead.   
Insisting that the entire country was amazed by the government’s “resolution to leave 
Khartoum, Sinkat, and Tokar to their fate with humiliation and anxiety,” the Standard 
hoped that the government would not “tarnish the English name by withholding 
assistance from the beleaguered garrisons who, with the exercise of a little spirit and the 
expenditure of a little money, might be—or would have been—rescued from a terrible 
fate.”  The Standard further contended that, if Britain gave the Sudan to the Mahdi, 
“there would be no hope of a strong and beneficial administration at Cairo.” The paper 
claimed that with proper governance, “there was no reason why his southern domains 
should not add strength and dignity to the throne of the khedive.”   The Daily 111
Telegraph similarly charged:   
It is necessary to urge that the British government shall spare no effort to rescue the 
victims of its tardy resolution. There are British soldiers enough in Egypt today to drive 
 Standard, 11 January 1884, 5. 111
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the Mahdi over the equator if they could only get at him; and yet, in fear as we are of 
hearing of frightful disasters, they are helpless at Cairo.     112
  
The Morning Post counseled that “if the six thousand Egyptian troops at Khartoum, with 
the Europeans in that town…are massacred in attempting to retreat across the desert, the 
responsibility of the British government for such a catastrophe cannot be disavowed.”   113
It therefore recommended that a force of some four to six thousand Indians and Nubians 
could affect the safe withdrawal of the Khartoum garrison.   The Morning Advertiser 114
echoed those remarks stating:   
It seems to us that no effort that Her Majesty’s government could make would be 
too great for securing the safety of the defenders of Khartoum and the remnant 
of the European population under its protection.  If disaster, and possibly 
massacre, should overtake the column of fugitives from Khartoum there would 
be an outburst of indignation from the civilized world.   115
  
The Liverpool Courier posited that “the abandonment of the Sudan may or may not be 
wise as a political step, [but] the abandonment of the imperiled garrison and the 
Christian people who imagined that England was ruling Egypt is a crime that will cover 
the British name with indelible infamy.”     116
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That Gordon’s statements had an impact on public opinion and policy decisions 
did not go unnoticed by a London correspondent for the Hampshire Advertiser who 
observed just a few days after Stead’s interview appeared in the Pall Mall Gazette:    
The publication of General Gordon’s opinions has done a great deal to 
strengthen the hands of those who have all along urged the fatality of the 
abandonment, while the sensitiveness, even of the government itself, to the 
criticism on its own project, is shown by its contradiction of the suggested 
abandonment of Souakim [sic].  “Nothing of the kind,” we are told by the semi-
official journalists.  Perhaps we shall be told by and bye [sic] that it is not 
intended to abandon Khartoum, and then that Berber is to be held, while as to 
Wady Halfa [sic] that is to be a mere basis of alterations.   117
  
Moreover, in contrast to Baker’s earlier plea in the Times for Gordon’s services, the Pall 
Mall Gazette’s demand that Gordon be sent to the Sudan provoked a great deal of 
positive response by the presses.  For instance, the London correspondent for the  
Sheffield and Rotherham Independent reported, that   
“Chinese” Gordon and his opinions on the Sudan are on the lips of all active 
politicians here to-night, and the possibility of the government intercepting his 
projected voyage to the Congo, and sending him to Egypt with extensive 
powers, is being eagerly discussed.    118
  
And while it noted that “some fancy the mere whisper of his name throughout the Sudan 
would dispel all danger,” the correspondent cautioned that “a little less hysterical 
enthusiasm would be likelier to secure the approval of the general public to any such step 
being taken.”   Dismayed by the situation in Egypt, the Morning Advertiser likewise 119
wrote, “it is not too much to ask that all England has been looking for the employment of 
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General Gordon in the present crisis in Egypt.”   The Morning Post insisted that 120
“surely it is not too late for the government to admit to their councils a man whose 
advice and cooperation in such a crisis as the present would be of incalculable value.”   121
The Times suggested that it was good that Gordon’s resignation had not yet been 
formally accepted by the War Office, as it was proof that the government recognized “his 
eminent services and [were] unwilling to lose them.” It optimistically offered that those 
services might not only be utilized to secure the defense of Egypt but also to effect “the 
restoration of the khedive’s authority over a part of the Sudan.”     122
  Still apparently intent upon going to the Congo, Gordon’s reaction to the flurry of 
such articles and demands for his services was to press for Baker’s appointment to the 
Sudan in a letter to the Times.   That suggestion, however, was completely ignored by 123
the presses; they wanted Gordon.  So too did Hartington, the war secretary, who having 
favored sending Gordon to the Sudan for some time, redoubled his efforts.   With 124
journalistic and political pressure quickly mounting, Gladstone and Granville acquiesced 
and offered the Sudan mission to Gordon.   The aforementioned process by which 125
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Gordon was sent to the Sudan rapidly went into motion.  Only nine days after Stead’s 
article appeared in print, Gordon was on his way to the Sudan.    
The significance of Stead’s accomplishment in effecting the appointment of 
Gordon did not go unnoticed by the general public.  As one observer expressed to the  
Times:  
The people who first obtained and forced on the attention of ministers the 
general’s opinions were the press, and it is to them that the country owes a tardy 
recognition of this great man’s power, and it is they who must be thanked if 
England and Egypt are rescued from their difficulties by his courage and 
gallantry.   126
  
Raymond Schults has contended that Stead’s efforts marked a truly significant point in 
the history of journalism.  To be sure, this was certainly not the first time the press had 
influenced a government into take a certain course of action.  What made it especially 
notable, as R. H. Gretton pointed out, was that this was probably the first occasion on 
which a newspaper set itself, by acting as the organizer of opinion on a particular detail 
of policy, to change a government’s mind at high speed.  However strongly newspapers 
had spoken before this on political subjects, they had not adopted the method of 
hammering, day in, day out, at a single detail, and turning policy into a catchword.”   127
That the press was so successful may have been due, as Gretton suggested, to the 
government being encouraged that they had been right all along to consider sending 
Gordon to the Sudan back in December.    128
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3.2 Press Opinion Shift 
Any ambiguity concerning Gordon’s orders evaporated when he arrived in Cairo 
on 24 January.  The Egyptian government bestowed upon him the title of governor-
general of the Sudan, and he was expressly charged by Baring to  
arrange for the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons etc. as rapidly as is 
consistent with (1) the saving of life and so far as possible, property; (2) the 
establishment of some form of government which will prevent, so far as 
possible, anarchy and confusion arising out of the withdrawal of the Egyptian 
troops.   129
    
To effect the second part of that commission, Gordon elicited the support of Zubehr 
Pasha, whom the government had considered as a possible leader prior to Gordon’s 
appointment.  He was also the only person, Gordon believed, who had any chance of 
establishing a responsible temperate government in the wake of an Egyptian exodus.  On 
that basis, Gordon requested that the cabinet approve Zubehr’s appointment.  130
 During the nineteenth century it was quite common for non-Western states to 
enlist the help of European military advisors in what James Glevin calls “defensive 
developmentalism.”  Rulers from the East would use these military advisors to to copy 131
European administration and rule of law.  This allowed Eastern governments like the 132
Ottomans to enact military reforms that allowed for easier mobilization of their native 
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populace and put in place a modern population control in the form of discipline and 
surveillance.  133
From the moment Gordon left Britain, hardly a day went by without leading 
articles in the British papers that reported or offered comments on his position.   134
Already successful in effecting Gordon’s appointment to the Sudan, the press continued 
to exert influence.  For example, the British government ultimately rejected Gordon’s 
request to install Zubehr because, in the words of Granville, “the public would not 
tolerate the appointment of Zubehr Pasha.”   Ostensibly this was because the public 135
opposed the idea of an ex-slaver being named governor-general of the Sudan.   Leading 136
the charge against Zubehr was the highly influential British and Foreign Anti-Slavery 
Society.  In December, when it was reported that he might be named the commander of 
an Egyptian army in the Sudan, the Anti-Slavery Society along with the Times strongly 
protested that move on the grounds that, given Zubehr’s history of slaving and resisting 
the authority of the khedive, the appointment would be “improper and dangerous in the 
highest degree.”   Three months later, although the Times recognized that Gordon 137
ought not leave Khartoum without first establishing a responsible government, it 
declared that “it is very much open to doubt whether any Government with a notorious 
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slave-driver at its head can be fitly entrusted to take the place he vacates.”   Reiterating 138
its opposition to the rumored appointment, the Anti-Slavery Society firmly urged that the 
government not “stultify that anti-slavery policy which has so long been the high 
distinction of England.”   That the public was so adamantly against Zubehr, Elton 139
asserted, was not so much a result of a campaign by the press, as it was because the 
government had not done enough to “enlighten public opinion” about the necessity of the 
appointment.   Queen Victoria, meanwhile, complained to Gladstone at the end of 140
February that “the decisive factor should be ‘the good and permanent tranquility of 
Egypt…and not public opinion HERE which is fickle and changeable.’”     141
Even while they opposed the appointment of Zubehr, the press and the public 
were still highly eager to see that Gordon was adequately supported in his mission.  As 
early as January 23 the Huddersfield Daily Chronicle had contended that “General 
Gordon may have great influence among the natives, and he may know more about the 
Sudan than any other officer, but unless he is well backed up by a strong force of English 
troops he might as well stay at home as seek to turn by his single arm the blow which 
threatens the chief town of the Sudan.”   In emphasizing the humanitarian aspects of 142
Gordon’s mission in the Sudan and Gordon’s future ambition to stamp out the slave trade 
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in the Congo, one clergyman wrote to the Essex Standard at the beginning of February 
that “under these circumstances is it not a national, nay a world-wide duty that we should 
give him all that we can give him—all that he asks for—our prayers.”   On February 11 143
meanwhile, the Times demanded that the government support Gordon adequately:   
It is incredible that the strength of the British Empire should not be adequate for 
such an effort, and, if it be, the obligation upon us to use it for the purpose is 
dictated alike for humanity and policy…At home, practically all classes and 
sections are agreed in calling upon the government to recognize and give effect 
to that responsibility, and ministers will commit an astounding and 
incomprehensible error if they delude themselves with the notion that a 
movement of public opinion so powerful and unanimous can be defied even by 
this phalanx of a parliamentary majority.     144
  
Gladstone’s administration was extremely reluctant to offer military support 
directly to Gordon in the weeks following his departure, a position that left the prime 
minister and his colleagues open to criticism.  To be sure, the Egyptian and British 
governments did send forces into the Sudan in 1884.  At the very time that Gordon and 
Stewart were making their way to Khartoum, for example, General Valentine Baker led a 
failed attempt to relieve a garrison at Tokar.  Immediately after, at the insistence of 
Wolseley and the Duke of Cambridge, the commander-in-chief of the army, a second 
expedition under Major General Sir Gerald Graham set out to relieve Suakin, a location 
believed vital for effecting a retreat from Khartoum.   This latter effort received 
considerable public support, as evidenced by a meeting held at the Guildhall in London 
and chaired by the lord mayor on February 15.    145
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Nevertheless, the Gladstone administration faced a Vote of No Confidence in the 
Commons four days later, and during the debate on that motion, Hartington spelled out 
the government’s position vis-àvis Sudan. “We are not responsible,” he said, “for the 
relief or rescue of garrisons in either the western or the southern or the eastern Sudan.” 
  He further claimed— disingenuously—that Gordon was not acting on behalf of the 146
British government but rather for the Egyptian government, which had occupied 
Sudan.    147
The day before this debate at Westminster, Gordon and Stewart arrived at 
Khartoum, where Gordon was received as “‘father’ by an adoring and enthusiastic 
crowd,” and he immediately set about the slow process of evacuating the 11,000 
Egyptian troops and civilians who resided in Khartoum down the Nile by means of 
government steamers.   When word reached him in early March of London’s decision 148
not to approve the appointment of Zubehr, Gordon informed Baring that, while he would 
proceed in evacuating Khartoum, he could not guarantee the completion of his 
instructions to leave behind a responsible government without the assistance of Zubehr.   
 By that time he had come to understand that the Mahdi’s movement was not just 
a response to ineffective and corrupt governance, but that it was a religiously inspired 
movement, and that as such the Mahdi could not be negotiated into allowing the 
establishment of an effective government other than one of his own making in the Sudan.  
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Gordon consequently warned Baring that “if Egypt is to be quiet, the Mahdi must be 
smashed up.”   Conveying to Baring a week later the paramount need for additional 149
support from “the government,” and specifically referencing the necessity of Zubehr’s 
confirmation, Gordon maintained: “I will do my best to carry out my instructions, but I 
feel a conviction that I will be caught in Khartoum.”      150
On March 12 the Mahdists closed the siege around Khartoum—a situation that 
would last some 320 days.  Telegraph communication between Khartoum and Cairo 
were severed and the only means for Khartoum to communicate with the outside world 
was by messenger across the desert.  The plans for evacuating the city thus came to a 
halt.  Even without the relief of Berber, there remained a window of opportunity for 
Gordon and a great portion of the Egyptian and Foreign contingent to escape in the early 
summer while the Nile remained high.  Such an expedition, though, was beset with 
considerable danger and had no certainty of success.  Weighing the risks and refusing to 
leave the Sudan in crisis, Gordon opted to stay in Khartoum, doing his best to secure the 
city militarily, attempting to ease the ever increasing fiscal and food shortages, and 
holding up morale.   All the while, he awaited the arrival of military relief—that relief, 151
which messages from London during the spring and summer insisted would not be 
forthcoming—ultimately did come, but it came too late.   152
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Throughout the spring and summer of 1884, the cabinet continued not to 
appreciate fully Gordon’s assessment of the impending Mahdi threat to Khartoum 
specifically or to the Sudan more generally.  Upon receiving his warnings and pleas for 
military resources with which to “smash the Mahdi,” the cabinet believed that Gordon 
was not only advising British military intervention but was announcing his intention to 
pursue his own course of action and willfully to disobey his orders to withdraw.  To be 
sure, earlier transmissions from Gordon to Baring, which had been forwarded to the 
government in London, suggested that he was launching military attacks against the 
Mahdi.  In truth, however, such actions were little more than intelligence gathering 
missions, and Gordon’s warning to Baring was nothing more than a predictive 
assessment of the situation.  In addition, messages from Gordon, such as the one that 
arrived on 30 March, offered reassurance that as of two weeks prior Khartoum was 
“quite safe.”   The overall effect was that miscommunication greatly affected the 153
cabinet’s, and especially, the prime minister’s understanding of Gordon’s situation.  
Thus, holding firm to the belief that Gordon could come out of Khartoum if he wanted, 
and apprehensive about being seen giving ground to the “jingoes,” Gladstone resisted 
sending a military expedition into the Sudan.     154
That resolve came in the face of stiff pressure to act.  On March 25, the queen 
appealed to Hartington through her private secretary that “Gordon must be trusted and 
supported…if not for humanity’s sake, for the honour of the government and the nation 
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he must not be abandoned.”   In fact, Hartington had by then been hearing from 155
Wolseley for nearly seven weeks that a large expedition should be sent to support 
Gordon, and by early April a narrow majority of the cabinet, including Dilke and 
Chamberlain, had become convinced that action was required.  They could not, however, 
agree on the size or scope of the relief expedition, and Gladstone and Granville took 
advantage of these divisions to postpone any decision into the summer months.   156
As new information from Khartoum became scarce, the press and the general 
public once again set the pace for government action.  Having earlier anticipated that the 
government would act to relieve Gordon, newspapers increasingly exerted pressure for 
the government to follow through when that support was not forthcoming.  A Cairo 
correspondent for the Standard reported in early April: “Lord Hartington’s declaration 
that General Gordon would receive assistance, should he claim it, has caused some 
amusement here.  It is well known that General Gordon has already distinctly asked…for 
English troops, which request has been ignored.”    On  April 8, in noting the questions 157
posed by Lords Napier and Hardwicke in the House of Lords about preparations for a 
relief mission of Gordon, the Dundee Courier insisted that “it would be well that the 
government could show that they are prepared for such a contingency as the relief of 
Gordon and those for whose fate we have made ourselves responsible.”    Four days 158
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later, a leading column in the same paper claimed that as Egyptian troops were 
inherently unreliable, any relief of Gordon would have to be effected by British troops.  
With that in mind, it maintained that Gordon’s reports, which emphasized the security of 
his position, were likely not completely accurate because Gordon, as an “enthusiast” to 
the work he was undertaking, was likely to “face dangers lightly.”  
 Arguing that the reports from the Times’s correspondent in Khartorum, Frank 
Power, were accurately conveying the seriousness of the situation, it insisted that “the 
optimist views which have been continuously pressed…do not accurately outline the 
situation of Gordon at Khartoum.”  The paper urged that “if we have any responsibility 
for Gordon’s present position…a more solicitous and anxious view of the situation by 
our Government would be justified than that which they appear yet to have entertained, 
or than General Gordon has himself seemed to hold.”   The Liverpool Mercury, 159
meanwhile, took a more sanguinary tone, assuring that “the government has done the 
best that could be done under the circumstances,” and arguing that “Mr. Gladstone and 
his colleagues may be confidently trusted to take all necessary measures for the rescue of 
General Gordon.”   160
Not every paper, however, was convinced that a British relief expedition should 
be sent to Khartoum.  For instance, Reynolds’s Weekly Newspaper acknowledged reports 
that the situation in Khartoum had become desperate and that Gordon was attempting to 
solicit Turkish support for the garrison by raising funds from English and American 
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millionaires.  Yet it maintained that “even if the English government resolved upon the 
relief of Berber and Khartoum, the sending of a British force is next to impossible.”    161
 To be sure, Reynolds’s Weekly, like many Liberal presses, was averse to decisions 
which they saw as furthering a jingoistic fever and imperialistic encroachment.  But that 
had not stopped other Liberal papers, such as the aforementioned Liverpool Mercury, 
from demanding that the government not abandon Gordon. Given that commentators in 
other papers explained that the hostile climate precluded any immediate relief, it may 
well have been that Reynolds’s Weekly was assessing the prospect of an expedition 
pragmatically.    162
 Further, the paper excused Gladstone for not responding to the opposition’s 
demands for a full explanation of his intentions in Egypt on the grounds that 
circumstances on the ground there were changing on a daily basis.   Having already 163
argued that a relief expedition was impossible, Reynolds’s subsequently argued that any 
military expedition into the Sudan to relieve Gordon meant the reconquest of the Sudan, 
which would be an “utterly worthless” expenditure of blood and treasure.    164
By the end of April, meanwhile, concerned journalists and members of the public 
translated their worry into civic action.  Promoters eagerly sought to put together a 
volunteer expedition to relieve Gordon, and private citizens who were interested in 
volunteering wrote to the press inquiring after the qualifications for service.197  One 
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concerned citizen suggested to the lord mayor of London, P. N. Fowler, that he should 
form a “Mansion House Fund for the Relief of General Gordon.”  Publicizing his 
response in the Standard, Fowler insisted that as a member of Parliament, he thought that 
“ministers ought to undertake the rescue, and both Houses would support them in doing 
so.”   However, as the lord mayor of London, he said that he could not agree to the 165
request, as it would bring him into “a collision with the government.”   166
 In a letter to the Times on May 6 a self-identified member of the Caledonian 
United Service Club offered that argued that the government was “paralyzed” to send 
any relief to Gordon for upwards of five months given the weather conditions in the 
Sudan. As such, the Government should make it clear to the “warlike tribes” that if harm 
should come to Gordon or the inhabitants of Khartoum that was “not warranted by the 
usages of war, no mercy will be shown to the leaders and instigators of such usage when 
the time arrives for the British army to advance, which it assuredly will, unless 
submission be made in the interval.”     167
Following Commons’ Easter recess, Conservatives in the body brought additional 
pressure to bear by submitting a resolution of censure against Gladstone’s 
administration:  
That this House regrets that the course pursued by Her Majesty’s government 
has not tended to promote the success of General Gordon’s mission, and that 
even such steps as are necessary to promote his personal safety are still 
delayed.   168
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With the debate over censure advertised well in advance and scheduled to begin on 12 
May, the motion encouraged a wellspring of anticipatory public activity.  On May 8 a 
well-attended meeting was held at St. James Hall in London, under the auspices of the 
Patriotic Association, to protest the “abandonment of Gordon.”  Denouncing the 
government’s conduct for being “devoid of principle, moral courage, and 
statesmanship,” Lord Cadogan insisted that “he mistook the character of the English 
people if it did not bring down the reprobation and indignation of the whole country.”  
Condemning Gladstone’s actions for being “dishonourable to the government and 
discreditable to the country,” Henry Chaplin, the Conservative MP for Mid-Lincolnshire, 
expressed his hope that a “feeling would be rapidly evoked which would compel the 
cowardly and caitiff crew who guided the helm of state to-day to take immediate 
action.”    169
 Two days later, on May 10, a group of 3,000 people—a small number of whom 
were Liberals—gathered in Manchester, and the organizers of the meeting accused the 
government of making “Gordon responsible for his own safety.”   Appealing to the 170
people to “vindicate the national honour and the national traditions,” and insisting that 
the government would be held accountable for the “liberty, the safety, and the life of 
General Gordon,” the Hon. Edward Gibson, member of Parliament for Trinity College, 
Dublin, advanced a resolution that a “big expedition would have to be sent to the 
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Sudan,” and it was overwhelmingly cheered and approved by those in attendance.   171
That same day, other public demonstrations held in Hanley, Darwen, Folkestone, and 
Shrewsbury produced similar resolutions that called on the government to relieve 
Gordon.   172
Meanwhile, on May 13, the House of Commons debated a motion to censure the 
Government.  In spite of their holding a majority of almost 120 seats, the Liberals 
survived narrowly on a vote of 303 to 275.   Only days later, the St. James Gazette 173
reported that the cabinet had resolved to prepare an expedition to Khartoum immediately, 
and that it was likely to embark by the end of July.  The story was subsequently picked 
up by provincial presses, including the Dundee Courier on May 19.   As we have seen, 174
Gladstone believed into the early summer that no relief expedition was warranted, a 
conclusion that was bolstered by reports sent from Gordon in mid-June (and appearing in 
the press in mid- and late-July) indicating that Khartoum remained safe. 207  Indeed, in 
early July, the prime minister reassured Sir Henry Gordon that his brother was not in any 
immediate danger, and that “whenever and if ever, General Gordon is in danger, the 
whole resources of the government will be employed in his cause.”   Confident that if 175
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messages could get out of Khartoum, then so too could Gordon, Gladstone continuously 
maintained that there was no need to extract him.     176
At that very time, however, key members of the cabinet forced the premier’s 
hand.  On July 13 Hartington and the Home Secretary Lord Selborne threatened to resign 
if Gladstone did not agree to send out a relief expedition.  Appreciating that those 
resignations would likely bring down his government, Gladstone presented the 
Commons with an appropriations bill on August 2 to fund a relief expedition.  Three 
days later Parliament overwhelmingly approved the measure.  Only a small cadre of 
members opposed the bill, and they were led by Henry Labouchere, who insisted that 
“General Gordon had disobeyed his instructions in not quitting Khartoum, and had 
forfeited all claims to sympathy and help by his insane desire to ‘smash the Mahdi’.”   177
But even while the press welcomed the news that Gladstone had finally decided 
to act and eagerly anticipated the rescue of Gordon, they remained deeply concerned.  
The Huddersfield Daily Chronicle wrote: “The nation demands that General Gordon 
shall be relieved from danger which has for so long threatened him, and much will 
depend upon the manner in which the government set to work to effect the desired 
result…But although the sum applied for by the government has been willingly granted, 
it is by no means clear what course will be adopted for carrying out the end in view.”    178
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If that effort should fail to bring Gordon back safely, the Chronicle insisted that 
the government would have much to answer for.   The enormity of the effort to relieve 179
Gordon did not escape the Morning Post, which anticipated that “it will be necessary to 
employ a very numerous force, much greater than could without risk be spared from the 
present Egypt, and we may, therefore, expect Mr. Gladstone to prepare the House for the 
dispatch of further drafts from either England or India.”   Indeed, despite Gladstone’s 180
willingness to move an expedition to save Gordon, the press remained skeptical.  Noting 
that nearly everyone ridiculed Gladstone’s unwavering insistence that Gordon could 
withdraw from Khartoum any time he wished, and recognizing that his position was not 
likely to change, the Huddersfield Daily Chronicle offered that perhaps Gordon could set 
Gladstone straight upon his return to Britain.   As it was, Gladstone remained in no 181
hurry to move, as a further three weeks passed before Wolseley was officially named the 
expedition’s commander on 26 August.  182
3.3 Martyrdom of Gordon 
 Well-documented by the London and provincial presses, the delays and set-backs 
that beset the two columns were well known to the British public.  Fears that General 
Wolseley’s columns would not reach Khartoum in time to save Gordon were temporarily 
assuaged, when, in the first week of February, papers such as the Times, the Cornishman, 
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and the Derby Telegraph erroneously speculated that Colonel Wilson had been in 
Khartoum for a number of days.   These were of course ultimately proven to be 183
unsubstantiated rumors.   In the case of Punch, on February 7 the paper grandly but 184
mistakenly portrayed Wolseley greeting Gordon in Khartoum with the caption “At Last!”  
It then corrected its most unseemly error with a depiction of a grieving Britannia outside 
the walls of Khartoum with the caption “Too Late!”     185
The country descended into mourning with the news that Khartoum had fallen.  
The Huddersfield Daily Chronicle observed that “since the arrival of the news of the fall 
of Khartoum, but little else has been talked about.”   Weeks later, on March 13, crowds 186
attended memorial services for Gordon in London, Manchester, and Durham.   Public 187
dismay at the fall of Khartoum led to speculation about who was accountable for the 
disaster.  The two names which immediately rose to the surface were Gladstone and 
Wolseley.  In his defense, Gladstone and his supporters in and outside of Parliament 
attempted to deflect responsibility from the government by blaming the military and 
specifically Wolseley.  They emphasized that nearly two months passed between the time 
of Wolseley’s commission and the point at which the expedition finally began heading 
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up the Nile.  In addition, those who deflected blame from the prime minister also focused 
on Wolseley’s insistence to move up the Nile instead of taking the overland approach.  
For example, in his contemporary history of the Egyptian campaigns, Royle argued that 
even though Wolseley’s force might well have had to fight along the Suakin to Berber to 
Khartoum route, that passage would still have been shorter and taken less time than the 
longer river route.   Wolseley and his supporters refuted the charges, and directed the 188
blame back on Gladstone.  If Gladstone had acted promptly, Wolseley argued, the delays 
incurred in preparation and in executing the relief notwithstanding, he would have 
arrived in Khartoum in plenty of time to save the besieged officer.     189
In general, those who had favored sending a relief expedition long before it was 
authorized tended to side with Wolseley.  In letters to the independent-minded  
Huddersfield Daily Chronicle, two troubled citizens eulogized the fallen soldier thusly:  
   ON HEARING OF GORDON’S DEATH  
  
Brave Gordon—gone—  
The Arab spear hath pierced his breast,  
And freed his soul; while ever and anon  
England asked why her foremost son should rest  
Forsaken—pitilessly left to shift as best he might,  
What days of toil, what nights of troubled rest  
Were his.  Khartoum his prison, treachery lurking there,  
A multitude to feed.  Sustained by prayer  
And faith in God, he need his mighty skill;  
                                   Mounting each crested billow as it rose,   
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Almost like Him who uttered, “Peace be still.”  
And twice six months he kept at bay his foes,  
With soldiers who had nothing save the name;  
Intent to his duty, and the fame Of his dear 
country to uphold.  Oh shame!  
                                   Thrice shame! on those who let him die.  
Britannis, blush and weep.  That craven policy, Whispering 
expense, delay, and peace hypocricy,[sic] Should sacrifice thy 
noblest, bravest son.  
                                   Go write his epitaph.  Say here lies one  
                                   Of matchless valour, infinite resource;  
                                   A lion’s heart, yet gentle as the wind  
Which play’s on summer’s eve; his force Of mind, 
sustained by Him, whom well he loved.  
And I—you, I!—forsook him, left him e’en to die.  
                                   Amid a scene of savage butchery.  
 W. H. G.       190
      
GORDON  
Is this the land of Nelson,  
The land of Pitt and Clive,  
The land of Cromwell, Raleigh,       
Or  Palmerston’s Old Hive?...  
    
Praying that they would send him [Gordon]  
Only three thousand men, To 
unbeleaguered Berber,  
To smash the tiger’s den.  
But their good faces lengthened,  
And their small hearts stood still,  
They blankly gazed and blankly said, 
“Twill spoil our Budget Bill.”…  
  
When school boys read the story, 
The indelible shame Will fill their souls with loathing,       
Their little hearts with flame...  
  
Some glow of pride will mingle  
With shams upon each cheek,  
And their little hearts will open, 
 And their little tongues shall speak.  
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And with their wreaths they’ll crown him,  
The hero of Khartoum,  
And will throw the names of those men       
Into history’s lumber-room.  
           J. M. R.   191
  
 Noting that the continental presses overwhelmingly condemned Gladstone for 
failing to act, the Standard argued that the government had had no case against the 
censure motion the previous spring.   On February 26 the Huddersfield Daily 192
Chronicle reminded its readers of those who had “abandoned Gordon” by listing the 
local MPs who had sided with Gladstone during that vote.   Deriding Gladstone’s 193
failure to act, the public reversed the acronym of his nickname “Grand Old Man” 
G.O.M. to read M.O.G. “Murderer of Gordon.”   With criticism against Gladstone 194
mounting, in early June theTory opposition moved against the prime minister in 
opposing his Customs and Inland Revenue Bill.  Although the measure was not a formal 
vote of censure, as Sir Michael Hicks-Beach noted, the vote “carried with it the life or 
death of the government” and had thus had the effect of a vote of no confidence.  On that 
occasion, Gladstone was unexpectedly and narrowly defeated, by a vote of 264 to 252.   195
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Gladstone duly resigned on 9 June and Lord Salisbury began the first and shortest of his 
three governments.     196
The public’s fixation with Gordon since Stead’s piece in the Pall Mall Gazette 
vaulted the general in death to martyr status.  The Leeds Mercury eulogized him thusly, 
“that he should have closed his noble life of heroic effort by the martyr’s death will 
strike all among us with a sense of fitness.”   Middlesbrough’s Daily Gazette predicted 197
that “his country will cherish his memory.  His name will live in history; his laurels will 
not fade.”   And the Suffolk Mirror insisted that “Gordon still lives in the hearts of men 198
throughout the civilised world, and whilst time lasts, he will stand.”   Likewise, at a 199
well-attended meeting of the Christian Mission Society in late March, the Earl of Cairns 
paid homage to Gordon’s career as a humanitarian and concluded his remarks: “if these 
things constituted the true type of a Christian missionary, and if a violent death 
cheerfully met and welcomed in the midst of life constituted a martyr’s death, then it was 
beyond all doubt that that great and noble hero whose loss England and the world were 
now deploring…was both missionary and martyr.”     200
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In keeping with a long tradition of recognizing military and imperial heroes, the 
country intended to memorialize Gordon.  Within weeks of the general’s death, the lord 
mayor of London formed a committee of influential persons, including members of the 
royal family and government officials.   After deliberating on the matter for several 201
weeks, the committee determined to open a school for orphaned boys and raised almost 
£16,000 in two months.  On May 1 1886, the Gordon Boys’ Home held its opening 
festival.   Meanwhile, Gordon memorials were placed both in St. Paul’s Cathedral and 202
at Westminster Abbey.  Adorning the cenotaph at St. Paul’s were lines composed 
specially by Alfred Lord Tennyson:   
 Warrior of God, man’s friend, not here below,  
   But somewhere dead, far in the waste Soudan;  
  Thou livest in all hearts, for all men know  
   This earth hath borne no simpler, nobler man.   203
  
In mid-March the citizens of Southampton urged the commissioning of a statue to their 
fallen son.   In April, at the initiation of the Marquis of Huntly, family and members of 204
clan Gordon eagerly proposed that a Scottish memorial to Gordon be erected in 
Aberdeen.   That same month, the citizens of Liverpool established the Liverpool 205
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Gordon’s Working Lads Institute.   In 1888 a contemplative statue of Gordon, was 206
erected in Trafalgar Square, in the company of two of the country’s other great martyrs, 
Admiral Lord Nelson and General Sir Henry Havelock.   Two years later a statue 207
depicting Gordon sitting astride a camel was erected outside the regimental headquarters 
of the Corps of Royal Engineers in Chatham.    208
For several years 26 January did not pass without a newspaper noting that it was 
the day on which Gordon had died in Khartoum.  In 1888, for instance, the Times 
claimed that he was still very much in the hearts and minds of the British public, and the 
paper drew a biting contrast between the general sentiment and political actors:   
Yesterday many thousands of Englishmen, and those especially who place 
patriotism above party, were saddened by the memory of an event scarcely, we 
believe, to be paralleled in the annals of the nation…History will judge between 
him and those who, for the purpose of an ignoble ambition, gambled with that 
noble life.  It is rather significant, however, of the levity of modern politics to 
find that among all the orators who are deafening the public ear with their 
speeches scarcely one was mindful of this solemn anniversary…It would be 
well, to be sure, for the Gladstonian party if that oblivion were complete, but 
notwithstanding the silence of politicians on both sides, the nation is not wholly 
forgetful of Gordon’s devotion and Gordon’s fate.    209
On 26 January 1891, a short “in memorium” notice dedicated to Gordon appeared in the 
Times for the last time.   Even so, Gordon was hardly forgotten.  In 1899, in the 210
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aftermath of Kitchener’s victory at Omdurman and in the course of delivering a sermon 
on Matthew 20, the Bishop of Peterborough resurrected the memory of Gordon stating: 
“Thank God for the Presence in His Church has touched our nation’s life and worked for 
righteousness—only the last few years have given us proof of it.  The hero of the 
people’s hearts has been the man, Charles Gordon, whose heroic death and Christian life 
won men’s esteem.  It was to honour him that in the very flush of victory our soldiers 
bared their heads to join their intercessions—Anglicans, Romans, Presbyterians—and 
gave this tribute of their honour to a righteous man.”   And, in 1933, on the centenary 211
of Gordon’s birth, memorial services were held at St. Paul’s Cathedral and in Trafalgar 
Square.    212
 Even while the press ceased printing memorial notices, a long-term recognition 
and interest in Gordon persisted.  The degree to which imperialism was a fixture of 
Victorian society is evidenced through Victorian popular literature.  While that issue will 
be examined more substantially in chapter 5, it is nevertheless fitting at this point to 
comment briefly on as to how the treatment of Gordon illustrated that wider narrative.   
 Whereas George Birkbeck Hill’s work on Gordon’s early career in the Sudan 
failed to generate or receive much interest before he was reassigned to the Sudan in 
January 1884, in the aftermath of Gordon’s death, the work subsequently underwent 
several editions.  In addition to the numerous contemporary works about Gordon cited 213
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earlier, Colonel (later Major General) Sir William F. Butler published a Gordon 
biography in February 1889 that became a bestseller.  It was subsequently reprinted in 
March 1889, 1891, 1892, and 1893.  After public interest in the Sudan was reinvigorated 
by Britain’s reentry into the Sudan in 1896, the work went through additional printings in 
1897, 1898, 1899, and thereafter in 1901, 1903, 1904, 1907, 1913, 1920, and 1921.   214
Speaking to the general proliferation of such works, the Leeds Mercury observed in 1896 
that “of the making of books concerning General Gordon there seems to be no end.”     215
Extending beyond works that were solely dedicated to Gordon, other writings 
included noticeable references to the imperial martyr.  For instance, Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle subtly rounded out the Victorian attributes of his famed detective, Sherlock 
Holmes, by mentioning that an engraving of the late general hung on the wall of his 
apartments at 221b Baker Street.   Later when Conan Doyle was forced by popular 216
demand to resurrect Holmes from an untimely death at Reichenbach Falls and fill in the 
missing years, the author wove into the detective’s hiatus a fact-finding mission to 
Khartoum on behalf of the Foreign Office.   Furthermore, the Sudan, Khartoum, and 217
Gordon also found a place in K. and Hesketh Pritchard’s 1903 serial “By Tammers’ 
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Camp Fire” which appeared in Strand Magazine from June 1903 to November 1904.   218
To those ends, the public’s longstanding interest in Gordon and his elevation to martyr 
status was certainly cemented by the circumstances of his death and had much to do with  
the fact that the public’s connection with Gordon had been established and encouraged 
by the press during the year-long siege.  In this way, as John Wolfe demonstrated, 
Gordon had much in common with the famed explorer David Livingston, whose 
exploits, thanks to the efforts of Sir Henry Morton Stanley, were also fresh in the public’s 
mind at the time of his death.  219
3.4 Conclusion 
 The advent of New Journalism under the auspices of W.T. Stead allowed for a 
more active press in regards to foreign policy. Stead’s push for Gordon to be Britain’s 
man in Khartoum sparked debate in the press on Britain’s role in the Sudan which mostly 
fell into a liberal versus conservative divide, with the liberal press mostly in support of 
Gladstone’s cautious approach to imperialism, and the conservatives antagonistic. It 
became hard to separate Charles Gordon from the Sudan as events evolved from the 
recruitment of Gordon, to a relief of Gordon, to a public mourning of Gordon. Thus, an 
image of a heroic martyr became associated with Gordon, sparking romantic imagination 
within the public discourse in newspapers. This romantic imaginary surrounding Gordon 
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would also take hold around the Sudan Campaign as well as literature, journals, and 
artifacts fueled the connection between the Empire and colonial adventure.  
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CHAPTER 4. ROMANCE AND PLUNDER 
 If  journalists created the frenzy to send Gordon to the Sudan, then popular 
imagination was fed as well by the literature, journals, and material culture read and 
viewed by the British public. Literature reflected the growing attitudes of racial politics 
and reinforced the role of education in creating a masculine ruling imperial class. 
Rudyard Kipling and Henry Newbolt used the Sudan Campaign’s failure to sell an 
imperial fantasy and the notion of the British stiff upper lip. By contrast, the imperial 
critic Hilarie Belloc would use the folly of the Sudan Campaign and other African 
adventures to paint a picture of an immoral imperialism that went against notions of a 
“Little England.” 
 As fictional accounts sparked the imaginations of readers, soldier recollections 
and journals provided an up close personal adventure. The journal of Charles Gordon 
was propaganda established to create a martyr. Soldier and adventure journals allowed 
for the plundering (both actual and literary) of the Sudan in a conquest of the Sudan 
through the print public. Meanwhile soldiers would bring back artifacts as physical 
manifestations of the romantic imperial imagination.  
 This chapter argues that these literary and visual representations of the Sudan 
within the wider public became the avenue where ideas about the role of Britain in Africa 
could play out. Was it good? Or was it an unnecessary evil? Imperial values became 
intwined with national moral character and virtue. British culture in the late Victorian era 
started to treat the Empire as a central location for romance, as critical voices emerged to 
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challenge the choir of cheers for the imperial enterprise. Gordon's journals became a 
symbol of martyrdom as well as public moralizing. Plundering, thus, also became a way 
to assert the moral character of the nation.  
4.1 Literature 
Kipling 
 Rudyard Kipling is often referred to as the “poet of Empire” for his enthusiastic 
cheerleading for the British Empire. Known more for poems like “The White Man’s 
Burden” and the novel The Jungle Book, Kipling early in his career as journalist wrote 
his first novel The Light That Failed in 1891. The novel would showcase the imperial 
themes of war and Empire that Kipling would become known for, but in the context of 
the Sudan Campaign. 
The story sees the protagonist Dick Heldar in a sort of bildungsroman set in late 
Victorian London. Poor Dick, mocked and ridiculed for his lack of material possessions 
as a child seeks, out enrichment through personal improvement. This improvement sees 
Kipling’s protagonist uplift himself through his ability to paint. His artistic abilities itself 
lend to his job as an illustrator for London newspapers during the 1885 relief of Gordon 
in Khartoum. It is in the Sudan where Dick meets the special correspondent of the 
fictional paper Central Southern Syndicate, Gilbert Torpenhow. The two men forge a 
close and intimate friendship, and Torpenhow promotes the work of Dick. But at the end 
of the novel both Torpenhow and Dick will have returned to the Sudan. Torpenhow's 
return is framed as a patriotic and honorable act, while a blind Dick’s return is an act of a 
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man being reunited with his true (though chaste) love in Torpenhow and showing his 
chivalric honor. Thus, connecting masculinity and war within a homosocial bond.  
Masculinity and warfare are inseparable in the reading of The Light That Failed.  
Kipling strove to use war as way to show the life of action which the hero had strayed 
away from.  The death of Dick in the Sudan, as a glorious sacrifice, was mirrored in 220
reality by the death of General Gordon. The 1884-5 Expedition to the Sudan under 
General Wolseley, to relieve the besieged Gordon at Khartoum, pre-dated the novel by 
some five years. The Sudan campaign, as Imperial and military history was clearly in the 
forefront of Kipling's mind during the gestation of The Light That Failed. 
The Anglo-Indian community, of which Kipling was a member,  reacted with 
enormous shock to the news of Gordon's fate, and we may be pretty sure that Kipling 
reacted in the same way, given his likely admiration for Gordon as a man of action and a 
hero of the Empire. Public opinion in Britain blamed the Government, particularly 
Gladstone, for failing to relieve the siege. As Kipling described in his novel “it was 
above all things necessary that England at breakfast should be amused and thrilled and 
interested, whether Gordon lived or died.”  Writing after the events at Khartoum had 221
unfolded, Kipling’s somewhat satirical sentiment showed the level of interest that the 
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public had in Gordon. His struggle was constantly on their minds, and checking to see if 
any news of the stranded man had arrived was a priority.    222
The events, described in Chapter II of The Light that Failed, and their 
background influence the whole novel, up to and including the final two chapters. 
Gordon himself has only a few brief mentions, but he seems to cast his unacknowledged 
shadow over the novel’s action. The most striking fact about the war sequences is that 
Kipling had never been on a battlefield, let alone in the Sudan campaign. It was the Boer 
War that later gave him his first experience of the real thing. He had only visited Egypt 
for four days in Port Said at the age of sixteen, during the 1882 Egyptian conflict.  So 223
the vivid description of war came from Kipling's own imagination enhanced by reading 
numerous eye-witness accounts of the conflict. It is not only the descriptions of action 
and scene that impress, but the attention Kipling gives to the details of military 
resourcing, tactics and logistics. 
The incident with Torpenhow gauging out the Arab soldier's eye as he grapples 
with the soldier, reaching for the man's face, clearly in understandable desperation. Soon 
after, he wipes a thumb on his trousers; “his upturned face lacked an eye.”  Even the 224
battlefield carnage is reduced to a single charged sentence “the ground beyond was a 
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butcher's shop.”  Thus, the description of violence with its vividness, stems from the 225
violence the everyday reader of newspapers throughout the Anglo communities in the 
empire would have been familiar with. The press had made the wider public familiar 
with the physicality of war.  
In the late Victorian Era, popular fiction was used by publishers to experiment 
with narrative and new and more sensational fiction. This allowed for unproven authors, 
like Kipling, to easily get published.  The American publisher J.B. Lippincott was a 226
market leader in such ventures, issuing a monthly magazine simultaneously in New York, 
London and Melbourne (using Ward, Lock, Bowden & Co. as the publisher in Great 
Britain and Australia), with a complete novelette by a reputed author in every number.  227
As The Light that Failed played out each week in newspapers, Torpenhow’s 
career as a war correspondent becomes that more important. In the late Victorian era, the 
war correspondent became a central player in the romanticization of the empire. The 
journalist was not just relaying the story back home to the readers, but was part of the 
action, becoming the central protagonist in his own adventure novel. This “novelization” 
of journalism created a spectacle of images and drama for readers safely back at home in 
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Britain.  This spectacle made its way in literature as the special correspondent became 228
the protagonist in novels by the usual suspects of Imperial novelization: Rider Haggard, 
Joseph Conrad, and of course Kipling. The fictional and real special correspondents, like 
Torphenhow in The Light that Failed or the real Archibald Forbes of the Times became 
stand-ins for Imperialism.  Thus, The Light that Failed represented the alignment of 229
reporting and fiction as promoting ideas and images of empire.  
Kipling also used the Sudan as a subject in his 1892 poem “Fuzzy-Wuzzy.” The 
title of the poem refers to the nickname that the British soldiers gave to the Beja soldiers 
who fought on the side of the Mahdi in reference to  puffy hairstyles worn by the Beja. 
These soldiers were armed with swords and breech-loaded rifles (spoils from battle with 
the Egyptian and their own service with Egypt). However, where The Light That Fails 
revels in Empire and the Englishmen’s honorable role in it, “Fuzzy-Wuzzy” promotes the 
bravery of the African soldiers, though in typically Kiplingesque patronizing affect. 
Because of the white dominance in England, Victorians considered themselves 
the most civilized race, and thus reinvented conceptions of race to create social 
boundaries with non-white races. Advocates of Disraeli's imperialist foreign policies 
justified these boundaries by invoking a paternalistic and racist theory (founded in part 
upon popular but erroneous generalizations derived from Darwin's theory of evolution) 
which saw Imperialism as a manifestation of what Kipling would refer to as "the white 
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man's burden."  The implication, of course, was that the Empire existed not for the 230
benefit — economic or strategic or otherwise — of Britain itself, but in order that 
primitive peoples, incapable of self-government, could, with British guidance, eventually 
become civilized.  231
The poem was first published in the Scots Observer on March 15, 1890, and 
would later be published as part of the 1892 Barrack Room Ballads.  Specifically, the 232
poem regales the fighting between the British and Mahdist forces during the ill-fated 
Gordon Relief Expedition. The expeditionary force made up of British, Indian, and 
Australian forces, were sent to destroy the Mahdi and put in place a more orderly 
government. By March 22 British troops, who were building a defensive compound at 
Tofrek, were attacked by Beja tribesmen under Osman Digna.  Both the British and the 233
Beja tribesman experienced heavy casualties, however, but the British government under 
the Liberal Government effectively lost interest and the Early Campaign dissipated by 
the summer of 1885.   
The Beja tribesman, or Fuzzy-Wuzzies, who had produced such heavy casualties 
for the British were of the Hadendowa, Amarer, and Bisharin tribes. The nickname of 
Fuzzy-Wuzzy was a deliberate attempt to patronize a ferocious enemy (and a less well 
armed one at that) since it was clear that "without a doubt these Arabs are the fiercest, 
 Ricketts, 233.230
 Hall, 42-47. 231
 Ricketts, 162.232
 Robert O. Collins, ed. Historical Problems of Imperial Africa, (Princeton: Marcus Weiner 233
Publishers, 1994), 7-56;  Edward Spiers, The Victorian Soldier in Africa, 99
!85
brave, daring, and unmerciful race of men in the world."  Though the attributing of 234
bravery to the Arab soldier could be seen by some in a positive light, the coupling of the 
praise in the poem with the racially demeaning nickname of "Fuzzy-Wuzzy" reaffirms 
the power relationship between the Arab and the British. Kipling's soldier acknowledges 
the awesome qualities of the tribesman, but diminishes them even though they broke the 
British square (combat formation).  
If a square was broken or penetrated the force could be wiped out, causing 
confusion from the hand-to-hand combat that usually ensued. A more linear formation 
left the British less exposed to the risk of chaos. However, the use of a square was 
beneficial when a small force was in operation. The use of the square was evident in the 
battles of El Teb, Tamai, Abu Klea, and Kerbekan. The ferocity of the attacks by the 
Sudanese would often break these squares creating hand to hand combat which evened 
the playing field between the two forces. However, despite this perceived equity, the 
“Fuzzy-Wuzzy” as Africans would never be equal to that of the brave British soldier for 
Kipling, and would have to be taught by the grown up school boy of Henry Newbolt’s 
“Vitaï Lampada.” 
Henry Newbolt 
“Play up! play up! and play the game!” So says the fictional soldiers in the fields 
of Sudan and the young boys on the playing fields of the British public school in Henry 
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Newbolt’s poem “Vitaï Lampada.” Newbolt’s poem, which can be translated as “Torches 
of Life,” was a celebration of the role of the public school boy in the Empire. Written in 
1892, the poem juxtaposes the schoolboy match of cricket with that of the soldier on the 
battlefield during the Gordon Expedition.  
During the nineteenth century sport in the public school was seen as an important 
factor of a boy’s education. It was seen a sort of social control in order to keep boys out 
of trouble, but also to teach them discipline and teamwork. The Industrial Revolution 
expanded the middle class, and created a demand for privately funded education.  With 235
the founding of these new schools, sport became a central component as it was seen as 
essential in the training of boys into gentlemen- a colonial elite- charged with the 
administration of the empire.  Thus, the school boy as officer in the Imperial army 236
takes his lessons from the school field of play to the battle filed.  237
These school boys would have been the audience for “Vitaï Lampada.”  The 
poem would have been part of the nineteenth century indoctrination of boys of a certain 
persuasion (read upper middle class) of certain virtues necessary for citizenship in the 
Empire. As the British red grew on the global map, the qualities of the so-called “stiff-
upper lip” were needed for the future officers of the Empire.  “Vitaï Lampada” or 238
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“Torches of Life” like Kipling’s “If” were emblematic of this moralizing. The public 
school boy would become the Colonial and Imperial figures who, like Charles Gordon, 
would supposedly sacrifice themselves in service to the Crown.  
The first stanza concerns a cricket match in which it is getting late and the boys 
are starting to wrap up their match. “An how to play, and the las man in.” The last boy up 
is not playing for the “ribboned coat” given for achievement in sport, or for the glory of a 
“season’s fame.” Instead, the school boy is batting for the respect of his Captain who 
implores of him to “Play up! Play up! And play the game!”   239
The second stanza brings the reader to the Sudan in media res of the Battle of 
Abu Klea. The British square has been broken and is now a “wreck.” The machine gun 
has jammed, the Colonel (probably referring to Fredrick Gustavus Burnaby) has been 
killed. The defeated unnamed officer is rallied by the voice of his old school chum, who 
uses the rallying cry of “play up! And play the game” to carry on in the fight despite such 
heavy adversity.   240
The final stanza implores for both school boys and soldiers to “play up! And play 
the game!” The young boys hold on to this moral lesson throughout their life and pass it 
on as adults to successive generations “like a torch in flame/and falling fling to the host 
behind.”  Thus, the role of the public school is to create the attitude within the school 241




boys that they carry on as adults to carry on despite adversity in service to a case greater 
than their own. Particularly, this greater cause is that of Empire.  
Henry Newbolt by 1921 would author the “Newbolt Report” for the Labour 
Government in which he argued that students should be exposed to a “sentimental, 
productive, attachment to the status quo” in regards to English Literature . In 242
Newbolt’s Vitaï Lampada” that status quo was attached to the notion of war as a 
romantic extension of field sport. The Empire is a big school full of non-white peoples 
waiting to be educated so that one day they might grow up into English gentlemen.  
This paternalistic attitude can be seen in W.T. Stead’s interview with Charles 
Gordon. Gordon explains that he “had taught the natives that they had a right to exist,” 
ignoring that a religious uprising against foreign rulers might suggest their conception of 
their own “right to exist” might be independent of Gordon- despite his own high praise 
of himself.  The basic assumption made in both cases was part of the larger rhetoric of 243
benevolence. The idea that colonization was inherently good to colonized people. For 
example, the liberal Charles Wentworth Dilke on India stated that: 
The two principles upon which our administration of this country might be 
based have long since been weighed against each other by the English people, 
who, rejecting the principle of a holding of India for the acquisition of prestige 
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and trade, have decided that we are to govern India in the interests of the 
people of Hindostan.  244
 If the public school was the paternalistic environment that created future Britons, then 
the governed colonies themselves become the incubator for future Britons to rule 
themselves. But some, like Hilarie Belloc did not agree with this Big England approach, 
and longed for a smaller less imperial Britain not rooted in the hypocrisy of empire.  
Hilarie Belloc 
Hilaire Belloc’s satirical narrative verse The Modern Traveler (1898) centers 
around the narrator Mr. Rooter. He is the only survivor of three associates who travel 
from the England to adventures in Africa. Though presenting themselves as explorers, 
they are in fact exploiters, speculators, and swindlers, and are given the self-explanatory 
names of Commander Sin and Captain Blood, by Belloc. Mr. Rooter recounts the 
exploits of his and his unfortunate comrades to an interviewer from The Daily Menace.  
Belloc would go on to become a critic of Britain’s Empire along with his fellow 
Catholic and Little Englander G.K. Chesterton. Here in his early career, Belloc is 
showing the critique of Empire that would define him in later years. In 1899, he made 
the distinction between colonization and empire. For Belloc, the white English man 
colonizing is different from creating an Empire. as colonies contribute and Empires are 
possessed which causes problems for the possessor.  Belloc undoubtedly was aware of 245
 Charles Wentworth, Greater Britain: A Record of Travel in English-speaking Countries, 244
During 1866-7, Volume 2, (London: MacMillian and Co., 1869), 369. 
 Hilarie Belloc, Essays on Liberalism, (London: Cassel and Company, 1897), 151-152. 245
!90
the large colonial struggles underway in Africa along with the travel narratives of 
Europeans into Africa with their exaggerations, and thus unreliable and self-
congratulating narratives. Thus, Modern Traveler is not just a critique of British exploits 
in Africa, but also the romanticizing and self-aggrandizement surrounding popular and 
widely circulated narratives of the heroes of Empire, and Mr. Rooter is their stand in as 
an usurper of truth and honor.  
Mr. Rooter’s unreliable narrative begins quite suddenly with our protagonist with 
his interviewer from the Daily Menace:  
“The Daily Menace, I presume? / Forgive the litter in the room.? I can’t 
explain to you/ How out of place a man like me/ Would be without the 
things you see, -The Shields and Assegais [Spears] and odds And ends of 
little savage gods…”   246
Almost immediately it becomes established that Rooter (who may have vague Dutch 
origins), Commander Sin, and Captain Blood are not in fact Englishmen, but are actually 
from obscure foreign origins. Sin and Blood are military and financial mercenaries 
respectively. Rooter presents Commander Sin as “Lazy, and something of a liar” who is 
“never known to pay.”  Captain Blood meanwhile is shown as being a financier whose 247
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chief affairs “Were buying stocks and shelling shares.”  Thus, the adventures of the 248
Empire abroad are being linked to foreignness and outside forces.  
This line of argument was seen in the back bench promoters of “Tory 
Democracy” and “One Nation Conservatism.” Lord Randolph Churchill (father or 
Winston) opposed the liberal government’s policy in Egypt and the Sudan. He referred to 
the government’s protectorate of Egypt as a “bondholder’s occupation.”  The British 249
were not in the Sudan for moral reasons, but instead were beholden to “Jewish 
stockholders” and international banking interests.  As a member of the Tory “Fourth 250
Party,” Churchill had a vested interest in exposing Gladstone and the liberal 
government’s policy as hypocritical in regards to policies in Ireland.   251
Writing in 1898, Belloc drew on the recent Battle of Omdurman and the use of 
the Maxim gun against the Mahdist in his famous axiom: “We have got the Maxim gun, 
and they have not.” During this battle ten thousand dervishes were killed with many 
more wounded. The British would see forty-eight dead and 434 wounded. The British 
Commander Major General Horatio Kitchener allegedly surveyed the resulting carnage 
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and proclaimed that they had given the Mahdist “a good dusting.”  In The Modern 252
Traveler, a mutiny has erupted form the native Africans the three “explores” hope to 
exploit. Mr. Rooter explains that Mr. Blood “knew the Native Mind” and that one had to 
“be firm but kind.” The gun is presented as a metaphor for the perceived supremacy of 
these whites over the natives. This supremacy is then reinforced quite literally with the 
phrase “Insisted upon…this position” is superimposed with an image the three being 
physically carried by natives.  
4.2 Recollections, Accounts, and Journals 
 Charles “Chinese” Gordon stood out as a national hero in Victorian Britain 
because of his qualities, achievements, and legacy. A major part of Gordon’s legacy is the 
sheer volume of personal accounts and correspondence he left behind. In 1881 a London 
firm published Gordon in Central Africa, 1874-1879: from original letters and 
documents. Three books authored by Gordon were published in 1884. Reflections in 
Palestine: 1883, General Gordon's letters from the Crimea, the Danube and Armenia, 
August 16, 1884 to November 17, 1858, and Text of proclamation of General Gordon to 
the inhabitants of the Soudan were all published in 1884 just prior to Gordon’s death in 
early 1885. Gordon’s friends and allies in Britain hurried to have these works published 
in order to further sway public opinion. The books supplemented continuing articles and 
updates on Gordon’s predicament at Khartoum published in The Times.     
Several other works and collections of correspondence published after Gordon’s death 
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helped solidify public opinion of Gordon. The journals of Major-Gen. C.G. Gordon, C.B., 
at Kartoum and General [Charles George] Gordon's private Diary of his exploits in 
China published in 1885 further solidify Gordon’s status as a national hero in the public 
view. In 1888 Gordon’s sister also published a collection of letters from Gordon entitled: 
Letters of general C.G. Gordon to his sister, M.A. Gordon. In all Gordon’s writings cover 
the span of his entire career. Gordon leaves his own account and personal account from 
his years as a junior officer in the Crimean War to his death during the fall of Khartoum.  
 The first scholarly work on Gordon came from Demetrius Charles de Kavanagh 
Boulger. Boulger’s The Life of Gordon, stands out from other works on Gordon for 
several reasons. Boulger knew Gordon on a somewhat personal basis. Boulger actually 
asked Gordon’s permission to write a biography in 1881 to which Gordon’s “laughing 
reply was: “You know I shall never read it, but you can have all the papers now in the 
possession of my brother, Sir Henry Gordon”.”
 
Boulger functioned as editor of 253
General Gordon’ s Letters from the Crimea, The Danube and Armenia, published in 
1884. His introduction to the letters reflects his intent to rally the people and create public 
pressure to force Prime Minister Gladstone to relieve Gordon and end the siege at 
Khartoum. Boulger’s contribution to Gordon’s legacy is immeasurable. His connection to 
Gordon leaves scholars with a well focused survey of Gordon’s life in spite of any 
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prejudices or preferences in the content of Boulger’s work. Other scholars and writers of 
the had considerably less access to Gordon than Boulger.   
 In 1899, a young British officer named Winston Spencer Churchill published his 
own account of the war in the Sudan. The first edition was printed less than three years 
after the publication of Boulger’s The Life of Gordon. Churchill’s The River War: An 
Account of the Reconquest of the Sudan only discussed Gordon’s role in the Sudan 
briefly. Churchill recognized that Gordon would have a lasting impact on British history. 
Churchill provides a very vivid and elaborate portrayal even going to the extent of noting 
the juxtaposition of two idealistic and religious leaders, Gordon and the Mahdi.  In 254
Churchill’s own words: “It is impossible to study any part of Charles Gordon’s career 
without being drawn to all the rest.”  He also portrays Gordon as a man “sustained by 255
two great moral and mental stimulants: his honor as a man, his faith as a Christian.”  256
The British people of the Victorian era claimed Gordon as a hero and a martyr.  
 Historian Lytton Strachey considered Gordon to be one of the most distinguished 
people of the Victorian era. The section on Gordon in Strachey’s Eminent Victorians  has 
long been one of the standard scholarly works on Gordon. The book first published in 
1918 makes it one of the first accounts written long enough after the fall of Khartoum to 
cut through some of the myth, legend and propaganda surrounding Gordon’s life. 




Strachey’s account like so many others portrays Gordon as an honorable man and a 
devout Christian. But, the biggest propagandizer of Gordon, was Gordon. 
 In The Journals of Major-Gen. C. G. Gordon, C. B., at Khartoum, Gordon is first 
and foremost interested in protecting himself and his position in Khartoum and 
preemptively push back against criticism from Gladstone and the Liberal party. Gordon 
had to remind the reader that Britain’s options in the Sudan were limited. To this end, he 
warned that a complete British withdrawal from the region would force those Sudanese 
opposed to the Mahdi to become his supporters:  
Of course the moment it is known we are going to evacuate, we drive all neutrals, and even 
friendlies of the country into the arms of the Mahdi, for they will calculate ‘‘We are going to 
be left, and consequently we must, for our own interests, do something for the Mahdi, in 
order to hedge our position.’’ This means that arrayed against our evacuation will be the mass 
of those living in our midst, and who are now with us.  257
 On September 17, he warned of the danger of the spread of the Mahdist 
movement to other Islamic populations:  
[I]f the Mahdi takes Khartoum (which will entail the fall of every town in Soudan) it will 
need a large force to stay his propaganda. According to the Greek [Consul] he meditates an 
envasion of Egypt and Palestine, where they are all ready to rise. It cannot be too strongly 
impressed on the public that it is not the Mahdi’s forces which are to be feared, but the rising 
of the populations by his emissaries.  258
 According to Gordon, Britain did not have the luxury of abandoning the Sudan to 
its fate, as the Mahdi’s continued success would threaten the British position in Egypt and 
incite political unrest among Islamic populations from Turkey to India. With outright 
abandonment inadvisable, what options did Britain have left? Gordon emphasized that 
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any proposal of options on his part had been constrained by an imperial morality based 
on economic frugality and territorial retrenchment:  
In discussing this question I have entirely put my own peculiar views out of the question: to 
give up countries which are to some degree civilized, which, if properly governed, are quiet 
and orderly . . . and to allow of the slave trade to flourish again in tenfold intensity, is not a 
very high role, but quoi faire? We have not the men to govern these lands, we cannot afford 
the money; consequently, I advise what I have said.  259
 The sense of ironic resignation inherent in this entry is apparent. Although 
civilized to a degree and amenable to proper government, the Sudan was nevertheless to 
be sacrificed to the depredations of the Mahdi and an unchecked slave trade in the name 
of a British withdrawal mandated by budgetary restraint. On the other hand, complete 
withdrawal would entail a threat to British interests throughout the Islamic world by a 
triumphant Mahdism. Consequently, Gordon reasoned that if the morality of economic 
frugality and imperial retrenchment was to continue to hold sway over imperial policy, 
the employment of immoral means was unavoidable. On this point Gordon wrote:  
I am only discussing how to get out of it [the Sudan] in honour and in the cheapest way ...and 
that way is, either by some sort of provisional government under Zubair, or by giving it to the 
Turks; it is simply a question of GETTING OUT OF IT with decency.  260
 Of the two surrogates mentioned by Gordon, the use of Turkey as direct 
administrator of the Sudan seemed the most obvious to Gordon. Nominally, Egypt itself 
was still part of the Ottoman Empire; as a province of Egypt, the Sudan was the property 
of the Empire as well. To be sure, the Turks would require a stipend for taking over the 
administration of the province. Even so, the payment of a stipend would be more 
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economical than the cost of a permanent British occupation. On receiving this proposal, 
Gladstone promptly rejected it.  
 Still, Gordon continued to defend this recommendation in the Journals as 
satisfying the moral imperative of economic frugality and retrenchment. On September 
15, he wrote:  
[T]here is the terrible outlay of money (which has to be met) for current expenses. Also who 
is to govern the country? All idea of evacuation en masse must be given up, it is totally 
impossible, and the only solution is to let the Turks come in.  261
He repeated the same argument in his entry for October 5:  
If you do not arrange with the Turks you will not get out of the country for a year, and it will 
cost you twelve millions, and probably then you will have to fall back on the Turks. Whereas 
if you arrange with the Turks you can get out in January, and it will cost you seven millions, 
including the two millions you give the Turks.   262
 Gordon was certainly aware of Gladstone’s previous declaration during the 
Midlothian campaign that the Turks were ‘‘upon the whole, since the black day when 
they first entered Europe, the one great anti-human species of humanity’’ and possibly 
anticipated the rejection of this proposal.  Rhetorically, however, the recommendation 263
suited perfectly his purpose of demonstrating the incompatibility of Gladstone’s 
principles with an authentic imperial morality. The same can be said of his proposal to 
employ Zubair Pasha, a notorious slave trader under house arrest in Cairo, as surrogate 
ruler of the Sudan. Like his proposal to employ the Turks, this suggestion was rejected 
out of hand by the Foreign Office.  
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 Once again, Gordon defended this proposal in the Journals on the grounds that its 
formulation was in accordance to Gladstone’s demand for a cheap solution that did not 
involve British responsibility. He fully admitted that such a proposal could destroy the 
credibility he had established with the humanitarian interest groups. Even so, he 
presented Zubair to his superiors as the lesser of two evils. On September 19, he recorded 
the following entry:  
I expect that my asking for Zubair to come up was the last drop in the cup, and henceforth I 
was a complete pariah, yet, in reality, if the Soudan [sic] was to be abandoned, what 
difference could it possibly make whether Zubair or the Mahdi carried on slave hunting, for, 
according to all accounts, the Mahdi is most active in this direction.  264
 In his entry for November 8, he expanded upon the advantages of using Zubair:  
It must be obvious that if Zubair was . . . installed as Governor-General, with a semi-
independent position and a subsidy . . . and your temporary presence, he would rally around 
him a huge following, who are now disgusted with the Mahdi and his dervishes, but who will 
be obliged to hold to him, because you evacuate; even those people with us, we perforce 
oblige to join the Mahdi. . . . As for the slave trade, the Mahdi will be ten times worse than 
Zubair, and you could make the payment of the subsidy (to Zubair) contingent on his not 
doing it on any vast scale. The Zubair solution is the sort of half-way house between rapid 
retreat and continued occupation, either by the Turks or yourself. The Mahdi could never get 
the people to rise against Zubair; it will be only because they are presented with no rallying 
point, and perforce they will join him if you leave. They would never have joined the Mahdi 
if Zubair had come up.   265
As the above quotations demonstrate, Gordon employed a strategy of conditional 
reasoning (if . . . then) to reveal the underlying grotesqueness of Gladstone’s imperial 
morality. If you would save money, then you must install the Turks as rulers of the Sudan. 
If you would minimize British involvement in the region and still quell the spread of 
Mahdism, then you must appoint as Governor-General one who is more ruthless than the 
Mahdi, in this case a slave trader. Following Gladstone’s imperial morality to its logical 
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ends in the Sudan would entail the establishment and support of Turkish despotism as a 
counter to the indigenous despotism of the Mahdi. Alternatively, the reestablishment of 
the slave trade on a smaller scale under the control of Zubair (with British support) would 
be undertaken to prevent slave trading on a much wider scale under the Mahdi. In this 
manner, Gordon not only defended his proposals as reasonable under the circumstances 
but also implied a vision of the absurd reality such a hybridization of incompatible 
elements would produce.  
 What, then, did Gordon believe to be the ultimate solution to the Sudanese crisis? 
Throughout the Journals, he repeatedly stated his aversion to a British occupation of the 
Sudan. However, I would argue that his justification for remaining in Khartoum ironically 
subverts this position and ultimately privileges a British assumption of responsibility. In 
this case, the argument Gordon employed was not the product of his own rhetorical 
invention but was an outgrowth of British expansion itself. In order to appreciate 
Gordon’s application of this expansionistic reasoning, a brief explanation of the 
expansionism upon which it is based is necessary.  
 The assumption of imperial control over a state or territory was often preceded by 
the formal or informal establishment of a British alliance with one of the tribal/ ethnic/
religious groups within the area in question. In many instances, such a group actually 
sought an alliance with Britain as a means of protection from rival groups. The inevitable 
outcome of the arrangement was the military subjugation of the rival groups, the 
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imposition of imperial authority, and the elevation of the British allies to a position of 
favored status.   266
 This process of expansion facilitated the rhetorical invention of imperial rhetors 
by providing a powerful emotional and ethical justification for the extension and/or 
maintenance of empire in areas torn by social conflict. Sudanese culture in the early 
1880s was divided along religious lines. The more orthodox Islamic upper classes 
resisted the Mahdi’s claims of religious authority while the lower classes supported his 
calls for the purification of Islam through the expulsion of the hated Egyptians. While the 
Islamic orthodoxy hailed Gordon’s appointment as Governor-General and accorded him a 
hero’s welcome on his arrival in Khartoum, the Mahdists regarded him as an example of 
British interference and called for the extermination of those Sudanese who supported 
him.  Thus for Gordon, the essential underlying ‘‘truth’’ of the nature of British 267
involvement in the Sudan was the moral imperative to honor the trust placed in the 
British by their Sudanese allies. Although the British government wished to abandon the 
Sudanese people to the Mahdi, Gordon could not allow himself to desert those who 
trusted him. In this manner, the reader’s sense of shame and guilt was evoked in order to 
justify the assumption of imperial responsibility for the Sudan.  
 This appeal was especially evident in Gordon’s entries for September 29 and 
November 9. On September 29, Gordon wrote:  
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I do not dictate, but I say what every gentleman in Her Majesty’s Army would agree 
to*that it would be mean . . . to leave men who (though they may not come up to our 
ideas as heroes) have stuck to me, though a Christian dog in their eyes, through great 
difficulties, and thus force them to surrender to those who have not conquered them and 
to do that at the bidding of a foreign Power, to save one’s own skin.  268
 As the siege wore on, Gordon became even more defiant in his resolve to remain 
in Khartoum. In the entry for November 9, he imagined the following argument asserted 
against his abandonment of Khartoum by the Sudanese who trusted in him for their 
deliverance:  
The people here would reason thus, if I attempted to leave: ‘‘You came up here, and had you 
not come, we should have some of us got away to Cairo, but we trusted in you to extricate us; 
we suffered and are suffering great privations, in order to hold the town. Had you not come 
we should have given in at once and obtained pardon; now we can, after our obstinate 
defence, expect no mercy from the Mahdi, who will avenge on us all the blood which has 
been spilt around Khartoum. You have taken our money and promised to repay us; all this 
goes for naught if you quit us; it is your bounden duty to stay by us, and to share our fate; if 
the British Government deserts us that is no reason for you to do so, after our having stood by 
you.’’ I declare positively, and once for all, that I will not leave the Soudan [sic] until every 
one who wants to go down [i.e., escape to Egypt] is given the chance to do so, unless a 
government is established, which relieves me of the charge; therefore if any emissary by 
letter comes up here ordering me to come down, I WILL NOT OBEY IT, BUT WILL STAY 
HERE, AND FALL WITH THE TOWN, AND RUN ALL RISKS.  269
 Although born of an impersonal process of imperial expansion, such an appeal to 
guilt could not fail to affect readers. However, it was not just sentimentality that perked 
the interest of the readership back home. Trophies and the exoticism of the Sudan 
fascinated as well.  
4.3 Material Culture 
Egypt and its material culture fascinated Europeans throughout the nineteenth 
century. The journals of soldiers in the Sudan give a glimpse of the material culture from 
the Stand that they would disseminate to the readers at home. Alfred Milner, until 1892 
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the Under-Secretary for Finance in Egypt, criticized the way the Great Powers 
appropriated Egypt’s material and cultural wealth. His 1893 England in Egypt, begins:   
More than two thousand years ago, [Herodotus] the Father of History, in his 
comprehensive survey of the then known world, singled out Egypt as pre-eminently the 
land of wonders. ‘I speak at length about Egypt,’ he says, ‘because it contains more 
marvelous things then any other country, things too strange for words.’   270
Milner’s book is an account of reform spanning politics, economics, defense, 
international diplomacy, and more. But it is also a book about ‘things’: his Egypt 
remains a land with a compelling material culture.   271
Milner’s thesis was that modern, reformed Egypt must never again be regarded 
as a resource ripe for appropriation. Yet British servicemen had been doing just that 
since 1882. The 1898 operation to recapture Khartoum was the culminating phase of a 
protracted campaign against the jihadist forces of the Mahdīa, an insurrection against 
Ottoman rule instigated in 1881 by Sufi scholar and self-proclaimed Mahdi, Muhammad 
Ahmad. The events that unfolded over 17 years, not least the death of General Charles 
Gordon in Khartoum in January 1885, ensured that developments on the extreme 
periphery of the Anglo-Egyptian sphere of influence remained topical in Britain.   
Looting was popular with soldiers to most western armies during the nineteenth 
century.  But, it can also be viewed as part of a larger Western "moral vision" that 272
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allowed for looting as part of the view of superiority due to race, class, and history.   273
Evidence of looting in the Sudan includes a sheet of notepaper listing the spears and 
Qu’urans assigned to staff officers returning from the 1884-85 Nile Expedition. And a 
letter written to Reginald Wingate, then commanding the military intelligence operation 
out of the advanced headquarters at Wadi Halfa, by an officer returned from the 
campaign: 
  […] Can you tell me what has become of the [Battle of]Firket trophies [collected?] at 
Halfa. My name was put on several things that I wished to buy and it has occurred to me 
that the value of the stores which I left at Halfa with Neqhib Effendi for Smyth to take 
over for your mess might go towards the purchase of the trophies. If this will do please 
give instructions for them to be sent to me here, & let me know the balance I owe you. 
[…] Mortimer will send them to me if handed over to him, but if not well packed they 
are liable—as you know—to be looted. […] Can you & Slatin spare me a photo? I would 
like Slatin in Dervish dress if he has any left.  274
Take for example, the portrait of  Rudolph Slatin, escaped from sixteen years in 
captivity in Omdurman in 1895. His status as one of the few Europeans to have 
witnessed events in the Mahdist Sudan is reflected in his decision to be photographed in 
Dervish clothing, epitomized by the jibba, or patched cotton shirt, that signified the piety 
of the wearer, and his allegiance to the Mahdi. Everything worn and carried by Slatin in 
his photographic portrait had been recovered by Anglo-Egyptian soldiers from recent 
battlefields. In another photograph of three officers of the Grenadier Guards, Lieutenant 
Filmer, on the left, sits behind a Dervish animal hide shield recovered from the 
Omdurman battlefield. It is neither privileged in the photograph, nor concealed, 
testifying to a relaxed, quotidian attitude to looting.  
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The acquisition of spoils was manifestly regarded as a legitimate practice in 
which all ranks actively indulged. Despoliation provides a way to think about the Anglo-
Egyptian counter-insurgency campaign as a continuous series of cross-cultural 
encounters: with Egyptian military allies; with local peoples; with the natural world and 
the built environment; and with the enemy. Looting and trophy taking influenced how 
Egypt and the Sudan were perceived and understood in Britain—and how Britons 
perceived and understood themselves.  
  In late 1883 British troops encountered Hadendowa tribesmen and their allies 
under Osman Digna for the first time, and it came as a shock. Digna’s troops attacked 
aggressively and with tactical dexterity, punishing Anglo-Egyptian mistakes, despite 
their lack of modern weapons. Everything Dervish men carried into battle—from war 
drums to prayer beads—was avidly collected. But looting and trophy taking was a facet 
of Sudanese tribal cultures too.  
 Rudolf Carl von Slatin’s autobiographical account of his duties as the Egyptian 
Governor of Dara in southwest Darfur in 1881 sets out what participants in inter-tribal 
conflicts regarded as suitable for appropriation, including women and children, crops and 
flocks, and weapons and equipment. Their capture from, and denial to, their adversaries 
was as symbolic as it was instrumental.  
Slatin was just one of many colonial administrators who learned on the job how 
local leaders manipulated cross-cultural regimes of value to their political advantage.  275
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He recounts village Sheikh Muslem Wad Kabbashi’s conditional appreciation of Charles 
Gordon, whom he remembered for his bravery in battle, but also for the way that:  
when he [Gordon] divided the spoil, no one was forgotten, and he kept nothing 
for himself. He was very tender-hearted about women and children, and never 
allowed them to be distributed, as is our custom in war; […] One day, continued 
the Sheikh, “without letting him know, we put some women aside, but if he had 
found us out, we should have had a bad time of it”.   276
  Notions of authority and ownership are fundamental to determining "'dense' 
sociocultural meaning and value" assigned to objects that make up a society's material 
culture.  Slatin’s memoir, translated and edited by Wingate in pursuit of impression 277
management in Britain, is tendentious. But it nevertheless suggests how displays of 
authority and ownership were fundamental to the way Kabbashi, Gordon, Slatin, and 
others too, sustained their political legitimacy and social prestige. Each of them 
rehearsed what they regarded as their implicitly superior values and beliefs by 
determining how the spoils of war should be treated.   
What sets armed conflict apart in the context of the relationship between an 
object’s value and the manner of its acquisition, is the notion that what is at stake is the 
worth assigned not to objects produced in a given society, but acquired by it by force. 
The most extreme example of the relationship between the display of authority and the 
violent acquisitive act is beheading, and the subsequent display of body parts as the 
ultimate war trophy. 
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 The unlikely subject of this wood engraving for the front page of the 17 May 
1884 edition of the Graphic, is beheading. Victoria is depicted inspecting a flag recently 
captured during combat operations along Sudan’s Red Sea littoral. In Sudanese, 
Egyptian, and British culture, flags were regarded as significant military artifacts.  
  In his account of the 1884 Nile Expedition Colonel William Butler describes how 
he moved to secure a Dervish flag when his advance guard overran a hastily abandoned 
campsite:  
At the further side of the level ground stood a group of eight or ten Dervish standards of 
many colours…. In the khor, by the river, about a hundred donkeys and a few camels were 
standing or lying around.  
[…]  
I sent my staff-officer back at once to carry the General the largest and best of the 
standards, and...we began to collect the captured animals.   278
In A Trophy from the Soudan, the Queen reaches out to hold the enemy flag. The 
moral behind the image is located in the dance of acquisition Butler describes, and 
Victoria’s grasp completes: from Dervish commander’s standard bearer, to British 
soldier, to monarch. But in that moment this meaning was illusory: the recent campaign 
to check Osman Digna had failed to secure its political objectives: far from losing his 
head, Digna consolidated his control of the Eastern Sudan.  
 Unfortunately for Britain and Egypt, it was Charles Gordon who lost his head, 
when Khartoum fell. The disaster was sensationalized by survivors' testimony, not least 
when appropriated by Wingate in pursuit of his own agenda concerning the reconquest 
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of the Sudan: a national hero had died violently, and the head had been hacked from his 
corpse.15 Ensuing calls for retribution testify to the density of the sociocultural meaning 
assigned to this event in Britain.  
Reginald Wingate received this letter in April 1885:  
[…] my last letter was only as far as I recollect to urge you to not let anyone be in front 
of you in regard to recovering the head at least of Gordon - I feel that I can be confident 
that that will be your share of the work. [...]  279
When Wingate eventually managed to facilitate Slatin’s escape, the former 
prisoner’s testimony (edited by Wingate) added to the longed-for eyewitness testimony 
used to authenticate subsequent public accounts of events surrounding Gordon’s death, 
including Robert Kelly’s art works commissioned for Slatin’s book:   
I crawled out of my tent…. In front, marched three Black soldiers; one named Shatta…
carried in his hands a bloody cloth in which something was wrapped up, and behind him 
followed a crowd of people weeping…. Shatta undid the cloth and showed me the head 
of General Gordon! […] I gazed silently at this ghastly spectacle. His blue eyes were 
half-opened; the mouth was perfectly natural; the hair of his head, and his short 
whiskers, were almost quite white.   280
In the Sudan, Muhammad Ahmad’s prestige soared. Gordon’s head was 
displayed in Omdurman, where it signified the moral supremacy of the Mahdīa. Britain 
suffered a loss of prestige in inverse proportion. Gordon’s head remained painfully on 
display in Britain, too: Kelly does not hold back when he presents it to Slatin’s reader, 
for example: there it is, for us to look at—and look at it we must.  
  If the expedition to rescue Gordon had been a military failure (too little, too late, 
and at great cost in blood and treasure), the consequent ceding of the Sudan to the 
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insurrection was a political disaster. Public support for reconquest was motivated by the 
perceived need to recover personal, institutional, and national honor. The taking of 
trophies and their display would prove fundamental to narrative accounts of a job well 
done and moral order re-established.  
4.4 Conclusion 
 The continued presence in print culture of the Sudan and the events that unfolded 
there in 1885 was a testament to how strongly the consuming public connected with this 
romantic adventure. Kipling and Newbolt used the Sudan Campaign to frame larger 
issues of empire and the role of the British man in maintaining the existing order, thus 
reinforcing a Big England view of empire. Belloc, however, as a staunch Little 
Englander used satire as framing device to attack the romantic adventure in Africa, but 
also exposing the bigotry behind the opposition to empire.  
 The popularity and continued hero worship of Charles Gordon was in part fueled 
by his own hand in his journals from Khartoum. Gordon was keen on presenting his side 
of the story, creating a tragic hero abandoned by his Prime Minister in London. However, 
heroics in the Sudan came from journals, memoirs, and artifacts brought back by 
soldiers. This material fed into the imperial politics of power, thus, the conquering 
British after exacting revenge for Gordon in 1898, were able to present their subjugation 
of Sudan by absconding with cultural material. Thus, the Sudan Campaign became 
representative of the larger colonial project of subjection through its representation in the 
wider media landscape.   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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
 The events at Khartoum and the subsequent Sudan Campaign were part of the 
larger Imperial project and spheres of influence in Africa. But the Empire did not just 
exist in the periphery, it also affected the everyday life of Britons back in the home 
nation. The economic engine of the Empire produced goods made possible by the 
resources of the Empire. In turn, advertisements then sold these goods with the exploits 
and spoils of Imperial adventures. These adventurers were in turn made the heroes of 
literature. Journalists as special correspondents made themselves heroes in their 
dispatches from the periphery. Politicians then sanctioned these exploits by adding new 
colonies and “protectorates” into the fold.   
 In looking at the discourse in the press surrounding the Sudan Campaign, we 
have seen that the issues of empire were interwoven in the public discourse and were not 
just confined to Westminster and elite smoking rooms. The public engaged them in the 
pages of newspapers, and in the printed literature and memoirs. The public could 
influence and be engaged with policy through the press. Literature reflected the debates 
surrounding Britain's imperial role, and journals and memoirs romanticized and actively 
promoted the physical and metaphorical plunder of the Sudan.  
 The newspapers and literature, and by extension the reading public, were 
consistently attentive to imperial matters.  Specifically, in matters concerning the Empire 
in Africa, there was robust commentary about Britain’s actions in Egypt and the Sudan 
across the political spectrum Throughout these events, Conservative, Liberal, and 
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Radical voices spoke of the need to defend the nation’s prestige and not to lose face in 
the eyes of its Continental rivals.  British prestige involved a myriad of principles 
associated with classical liberalism, security, and economic and diplomatic supremacy.   
 For the imperialists, the perpetuation of these elements often necessitated a 
vigorous foreign and imperial policy. In the 1880s, the need to uphold British prestige 
was at the heart of intervention in the Sudan, the public’s perception surrounding 
Gordon’s mission to Khartoum and the public’s demands for his relief. Equally 
concerned about the nation’s standing, Liberal leaders and their press allies frequently 
opposed imperial interventionism on the grounds that it was detrimental to British 
prestige, as it proved to be an unnecessary distraction to the government, diverted 
resources, and pulled Britain away from its principled abhorrence of war, conflict, 
conquest, and subjugation.  
Throughout these events, Conservative and some Liberal voices spoke of the 
need to defend the nation’s prestige and not to lose face in the eyes of its Continental 
rivals.  British prestige involved a myriad of principles associated with classical 
liberalism, security, and economic and diplomatic supremacy. The role of the media 
within this political the milieu cannot be discounted. The omnipresent presence of the 
media in political discourse today can be traced back to the nineteenth century 
journalism. Editorializing and activist journalism predates our present criticism of biased 
and partisan journalism. The media, through the press and literature, became influential 
in the everyday private lives of the consuming public through the promotion of public 
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opinion. Thus, the Sudan Campaign’s representation in print culture can be seen a 
modern war, sold to the larger public for the auspices of political actors.  
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